

## Chapter 7

# Between War and Peace: The Role of Nationalism in China's U.S. Policy Making with Regard to Taiwan<sup>1</sup>

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Many Chinese strategists and analysts view Taiwan as occupying a critical geostrategic location whose control would enable the PLA Navy to move its maritime defensive perimeter further seaward and improve Beijing's ability to influence regional sea lines of communication. Alternatively, according to some observers, permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland would constrain China's ability to project power and provide the United States with a strategic foothold adjacent China's coastal economic centers.

The U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 28 May 2004.<sup>2</sup>

As is the case in other countries, the Chinese government's U.S. policy making depends on many factors, including various national interests and ethical values. One of the most important national interests is sovereignty.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese believe that Taiwan, a place with such strategic importance as indicated in the above quotation, is part of China and to separate it would be a serious violation of its national interests.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. claims that it adheres to the one-China policy as stated in the three communiqués in 1972, 1978, and 1982 between China and the U.S., acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China of which Taiwan is part.<sup>5</sup> This policy was based on the principle that U.S.-China relations were normalized in 1979, but the U.S. is also obligated to follow the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which stipulates that it will provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character. This implies not only that the U.S. can sell fairly advanced weapons to Taiwan to balance the PRC's military power, but that it may also rush to Taiwan's defense to protect its own national interests if China uses force to prevent Taiwan from independence.<sup>6</sup>

The result of the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan and the passing of the anti-secession law in March 2005 by the National People's Congress, PRC, has increased the chance of a military solution to the Taiwan question, and therefore

the likelihood of a more intensified confrontation with the U.S. Under pressure from China and the U.S., the Chen Shui-bian administration claims that it will not rewrite the entire constitution or change the name and flag of the Republic of China. Some in the Democratic Progressive Party have also contemplated their own one-China policy. But the Chen administration has taken steps to continue to move toward de-Sinicization and independence by appointing those who favor independence to his cabinet and transforming the constitution in such a way that it will be almost entirely new.

Both China and the U.S. face a dilemma. They want to maintain the status quo. China wants to focus on economic development, and the U.S. wants to focus on counterterrorism. Besides, maintaining the status quo has always been the U.S.'s best national interest.<sup>7</sup> Nobody wants to deal with an independent Taiwan at this time, because that would most likely mean that China would use force or other drastic means such as economic embargo, and the U.S. would have to decide whether and how it wants to intervene. Neither China nor the U.S. seems to want to fight a war with each other at this moment, but the question is whether or not they have a choice.

This possible scenario brings us to the issue of nationalism, as embodied by intellectuals of various kinds, and its role in China's U.S. policy making. How do various nationalisms conceive a future China in relation to Taiwan? How do these nationalisms affect China's U.S. policy making? There may be many conflicts between China and the U.S., such as those over trade, and those over the situations in the Middle East, Iraq, and elsewhere in the world. But the single most important conflict between the two nations is that regarding Taiwan. The paper will explore the ways in which nationalism, as embodied by various intellectuals, affects China's U.S. policy. This chapter will then answer the following questions: 1) In what ways is nationalism important? 2) What are possible Chinese nationalisms with respect to Taiwan? 3) What influence do collectivistic ethnic nationalism and its organic intellectuals have on China's U.S. policy making? 4) What influence may individualistic ethnic nationalism and the critical intellectuals have on China's U.S. policy making? 5) What are the implications of these nationalisms and their resultant foreign policy-making for war and peace across the Taiwan Strait? We contend that nationalism, especially collectivistic ethnic nationalism, plays a major role in China's U.S. policy making. A different nationalism, however, may lead to different results in U.S. policy making and different relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Using interviews, textual analysis, and the historical-comparative method, this chapter should help us better understand the dynamics between nationalism, intellectuals, and China's U.S. policy.<sup>8</sup> If doing so, we also hope to shed some light on the future of U.S.-China relations as well as the future of the Taiwan Strait.

## **1. The Importance of Nationalism in National and International Conflicts**

Nationalism is a notoriously complex issue, and its impact is also multifaceted.<sup>9</sup> Let us begin with two examples. In 2003, two major events were of particular interest to us in this regard: the American invasion of Iraq, and the spread of the SARS epidemic and the ensuing dispute between Taiwan and mainland China at the World Health Organization conferences. We will now discuss these two events and their nationalist implications respectively.

The Bush administration believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and it was one of the sources of terrorism against the U.S. According to Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesperson, the war was fought in order to eliminate Iraq's WMD and stop the spread of terrorism.<sup>10</sup> Although there was no solid evidence to substantiate either of the claims, the majority of Americans still supported the war. There may be many more reasons for the invasion, including the neoconservatives' conception of the world,<sup>11</sup> but the phenomenon also illustrates one of the most powerful forces directing human action: nationalism.

One can argue that patriotism guided the American support of war. Patriotism, which usually means an unconditional love for and devotion to one's country, is based on a nationalistic ideology—an "us" versus "them" ideology. Because we are a nation (nationalism), we need to love it, just as one loves one's own family, and we need to protect ourselves against others (patriotism). If nationalism provides the binding for a national group to start a political movement and subsequent nation-building, then patriotism provides the push for that movement. One has to participate in the movement, whether one likes it or not. A patriot would say, "We love our country, our land, our culture, and our people; therefore, we need to support our government against foreigners."<sup>12</sup>

Both patriotism and nationalism entail viewing one's own country in relation to or against other countries. Therefore, the American war against Iraq was a patriotic war on the part of the government and of most Americans to protect themselves against foreigners. To be against the war was unpatriotic. Many Americans, however, believed that the war was unwise and unjust and that true patriotism was to speak out against the government for engaging in something they considered wrong and unjust. However, this interpretation of patriotism is most often not recognized by the mainstream, in the U.S. or elsewhere.<sup>13</sup>

The government does not always do what rational persons think as the wise and just thing, but a patriot will support the government anyway. The state may not be necessary, but the patriot will nevertheless support its building. For a patriot, support is unconditional, and he or she is willing to die for it. Anthony D. Smith writes, "Men don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions." He states that "people do not

voluntarily die for things that are rational.”<sup>14</sup> Anderson reminds us that “nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love.”<sup>15</sup> Many progressive and cosmopolitan intellectuals also “insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the other, and its affinities with racism,”<sup>16</sup> or as Gellner says, its “murderous virulence.”<sup>17</sup> That self-sacrificing and sometimes near-pathological passion is derived from patriotism, which in turn is derived from nationalism. Nationalism is the roots, and patriotism is the fruits. Nationalism provides the foundation, and patriotism provides the devotion. Patriotism cannot exist without nationalism, and is therefore part of nationalism.<sup>18</sup> With such passion, any nationalist war is then conceivable.<sup>19</sup>

Another example of nationalism is the dispute, following the SARS epidemic, between Taiwan and mainland China on Taiwan’s membership or observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO), a United Nations agency. The Chinese government insisted that Taiwan was part of China and that the PRC government represented China. According to the U.N. charter, therefore, Taiwan could not become a member, since it was not a sovereign state.<sup>20</sup> The Taiwanese government claimed that Taiwan was a sovereign country and should be recognized as such or at least be given observer status. The mainland government, however, believed that to give Taiwan observer status, not to say membership, would be a move toward supporting Taiwan’s independence.

Taiwan is not a formal member of WHO, so its communication with the U.N. agency is limited. The disputes between the two governments made it difficult, though not impossible, for them to share information and coordinate their efforts in fighting SARS. Though actual information loss from not joining WHO was likely negligible, since WHO and the U.S. Center for Disease Control had people stationed in Taiwan to help with the fight against SARS, the psychological loss was huge. Again, the end result was that ordinary people suffered from the lack of information and the psychological war between the two governments, which was not conducive to handling the disease.<sup>21</sup> Compared with the hot war, such conflicts are minor, but they are a prelude to more serious crises.

Of course, nationalism is not always negative and does not always mean war. In fact, as Anthony Smith points out, historically embedded nationalisms are politically necessary and socially functional.<sup>22</sup> Politically, they can “make room for submerged and unrecognized culture-communities in a world of national states.”<sup>23</sup> Socially, “the myths, memories, symbols and ceremonies of nationalism provide the sole basis for...social cohesion and political action.”<sup>24</sup> Patriotism often serves to mobilize the masses for good purposes in times of emergency, such as unexpected natural disasters.

As a double-edged sword, nationalism makes it possible for individual groups to assert their interests, but it also sets boundaries between groups and nations, which impede communication and hinder relationships, resulting in serious

consequences for both sides. It is thus crucial that we understand how nationalism functions: how it works to improve human relations and human life and how it works to destroy them.

Nationalism understandably plays a crucial role in Chinese policy making. Understanding how nationalism works will help us understand the difficulties it brings and the ways to cope with its consequences. Neoconservatives believe that the Iraq war will bring peace and stability to the world, but others lament that the opposite is true. By invading Iraq under the circumstances, the U.S. has lost a chance to lead the rest of the world by example in responsibility, geopolitical restraint, and “a decent respect to the opinion of mankind,” as the U.S. Declaration of Independence says.<sup>25</sup> As Anatol Lievan describes, “What we see now is the tragedy of a great country, with noble impulses, successful institutions, magnificent historical achievements and immense energies, which has become a menace to itself and to mankind.”

In its relationship with the U.S. over the Taiwan issue, China also faces a similar dilemma. Can China become a great nation without a war across the Taiwan Strait and without more intensified confrontation with the U.S.? What role does nationalism play in this? Let us now look at the nationalisms available to the Chinese and how they might affect China’s U.S. policy over the issue regarding Taiwan.

## 2. Two Nationalisms With Respect to Taiwan

Nationalism, as isms go, is an ideology, as well as a movement of nation-building. Gellner says that it is “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”<sup>26</sup> Ideologically, nation and state should be one and the same, and the nation should be mainly a single, rather than multiethnic, nation. This ideology often evolves into a political movement for the nation to seek and exercise state power, that is, political sovereignty or autonomy that corresponds to one’s national identity.<sup>27</sup> Nationalism, then, can be viewed as an ideology that believes in the congruency of the nation and the state and as a social movement of nation-building or state formation. It includes protecting one’s sovereignty against foreign threat, as in the case of American, Chinese, as well as Taiwanese nationalisms. It is thus a discourse, project, and value judgment, as Calhoun observes.<sup>28</sup>

Nationalism as an ideology and social movement can be categorized in various ways according to what kind of nation-state one is building. We thus have many types of nationalism. For example, Anderson examines *Creole nationalism* in the U.S. and South and Central America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, *official nationalism* as embodied in imperialism in both Europe and Asia

especially before World War I, and *popular/linguistic nationalism* following World War II.<sup>29</sup> Anthony Smith calls these nationalisms *plural*, *civic*, and *ethnic*.<sup>30</sup> For official nationalism, Breuilly uses a similar term, *governmental nationalism*, which we will later discuss.<sup>31</sup> Hobsbawm discusses *proto-nationalism*, *ethnic nationalism*, and *linguistic nationalism*.<sup>32</sup>

Although there are many forms of nationalism, we will summarize it into two main kinds: *individualistic ethnic nationalism*, and *collectivistic ethnic nationalism*, to borrow two of Greenfeld's terms. For Greenfeld, when the nation is defined as an association of individuals (as a composite entity), there is *individualistic nationalism*.<sup>33</sup> This nationalism emphasizes human rights, liberty, and equality, the goals of which are realized in liberal democratic institutions. The democracy movements in China as well as in Taiwan can be seen as attempts at individualistic nationalism. Individualistic nationalism can also be called civic nationalism. One can become part of the nation if he or she identifies with the nation and is committed to its principles.<sup>34</sup> There is no doubt that civic nationalism can be oppressive, making uniform demands on the citizens without regard to cultural and ethnic difference.<sup>35</sup> This problem then can be dealt with by *individualistic ethnic nationalism*.

Greenfeld does not believe that individualistic ethnic nationalism is quite possible.<sup>36</sup> She states that ethnic diversity is antithetical to liberal democracy and that if we commit ourselves to the political ideal of the former, we shall weaken the latter. In other words, individualistic ethnic nationalism might be an oxymoron. That may indeed be one of the dilemmas of modernity, but we may be able to find some success in multiculturalism, or in what we may call a pluralistic liberal democracy. Mainland China has 56 nationalities, and Taiwan has four major ethnic groups (Hoklo, Hakka, Mandarin speaking groups, and Aborigines). When their governments talk about building a nation of multiple ethnicities with equal rights to all, they are talking about an individualistic ethnic nationalism. This nationalism can also be viewed as *liberal nationalism*, as explicated by Tamir, which emphasizes advancing both the cultural rights of the ethnic group and the human rights of the individual.<sup>37</sup>

Theoretically, it is possible for them to build such a liberal democratic nation characterized by an emphasis on human rights and equality among ethnic groups. That is also what the U.S., Canada, and many other nations are currently attempting, although not without difficulty. As Greenfeld implies, to build such nationalism is a difficult task. Such difficulties can be seen in the disputes on affirmative action policies in the United States, and in the current developments in mainland China and Taiwan.<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, when the nation is defined as a collective of individuals (in unitary terms), we have *collectivistic nationalism*. This nationalism emphasizes the interests of the nation, which take priority over the interests of the individual. The

latter's rights can be legitimately sacrificed for the good of the former. A certain elite determines what these national interests are. According to Greenfeld, this situation usually finds itself in socialism, communism, and socialist or popular democracy,<sup>39</sup> as in Chinese socialism and arguably in contemporary Taiwanese democracy.

If ethnic characteristics are of primary importance for membership in the nation, we have *ethnic nationalism*, a kind of collectivistic nationalism, which emphasizes inclusion and exclusion based on cultural and ethnic identities.<sup>40</sup> Ethnic nationalism often combines with collectivistic nationalism, and together they form *collectivistic ethnic nationalism*. This nationalism "consistently subjugates[s] the individual to the collectivity and consistently rejects[s] the notion of individual freedom as both unrealistic and immoral."<sup>41</sup>

For example, when the Han nationalists in China subjugate the minorities by allowing them less autonomy than they need for their cultural survival or when the Hoklo nationalists in Taiwan exclude others by speaking *Minnan Hua* (southern Fujianese dialect) only, by describing it as "Taiyu," or the language of Taiwan, which the other Taiwanese may not understand they are practicing collectivistic ethnic nationalism. Wang Fu-chang describes how Hoklo was used at meetings in the 1980s as a very important symbol of Taiwanese nationalism, of inclusion and exclusion.<sup>42</sup> Hoklo has been the "politically correct" language on many occasions.<sup>43</sup> If the majority group is in power and practices ethnic nationalism with state power, we have collectivistic ethnic nationalism. It is often the state's official nationalism.

### **3. The Influence of Collectivistic Ethnic Nationalism and Its Organic Intellectuals in China's U.S. Policy Making**

We have identified two kinds of nationalism, collectivistic ethnic nationalism and individualistic ethnic nationalism. We will now examine the roles Chinese nationalisms play regarding mainland China's Taiwan policy as well as China's U.S. policy making.

We will characterize the official Chinese nationalism as collectivistic ethnic nationalism, which emphasizes the interests of the Chinese ethnicity rather than issues like human rights and democracy.<sup>44</sup> This nationalism is reflected in both the state's policy toward Taiwan and that toward the U.S. The government's typical stance is reflected in the 5-17 Statement by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council just before the inauguration of the president in Taiwan in 2004:

The Chinese people are not afraid of ghosts, nor will they be intimidated by brutal force. To the Chinese people, nothing is more important and more sacred than

safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country. We will do our utmost with the maximum sincerity to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification of the motherland. However, if Taiwan leaders should move recklessly to provoke major incidents of "Taiwan independence," the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost.<sup>45</sup> (中國人民不怕鬼、不信邪。在中國人民面前，沒有任何事情比捍衛自己國家的主權和領土完整更為重要、更加神聖。我們將以最大的誠意、盡最大的努力爭取祖國和平統一的前景。但是，如果臺灣當權者鋌而走險，膽敢製造“台獨”重大事變，中國人民將不惜一切代價，堅決徹底地粉碎“台獨”分裂圖謀。)<sup>46</sup>

The first sentence is directed at the U.S. and other foreign countries that might want to intervene in the cross-Strait developments, and the remainder at the Taiwan administration. This stance is consistent with the government's position in other affairs concerning the U.S. and Taiwan. Below are Wu Yi's words at the World Health Organization concerning Taiwan's application for an observer status in 2003.<sup>47</sup>

"Since the SARS epidemic in Taiwan, the Chinese central government has shown great concern over the developments there, and quickly adopted a number of measures to strengthen the exchange and cooperation across the Taiwan Strait." (臺灣發生 SARS 疫情後，中國中央政府十分關心，迅速採取了一系列加強兩岸交流與合作的措施。)

At the same time, the Chinese central government agreed to WHO's sending experts to Taiwan to evaluate the situation there and agreed to Taiwan medical experts' participation in WHO's international conference on SARS in June. (與此同時，中國中央政府同意 WHO 派專家赴台考察 SARS 疫情，同意臺灣醫學專家出席 WHO 將於 6 月舉行的 SARS 全球科學會議。)

The Taiwan regime's political intention has failed in the past six years, and it will fail again this year. (臺灣當局的政治圖謀六年來均告失敗，今年也不會得逞。)

Facts have proven that any proposal regarding Taiwan, in whatever shape and form, will fail in the end. 事實已經證明，涉台提案無論以何種面目出現，最終都逃脫不了失敗的結局。

Wu Yi mentioned the central government several times, sending a clear message to Taipei that it is a local government. This is at least how Chinese nationalism conceives the relationship across the Taiwan Strait. The National People's Congress passed the anti-secession law at its annual meeting in March 2005. President Hu Jintao also made an important speech at the meeting concerning Taiwan. Both seemed to move toward compromise, but neither promised anything on democracy and human rights. They have basically still followed collectivistic ethnic nationalism.

Intellectuals *organic* to this Chinese nationalism, both in the official system and outside it, also support the stance.<sup>48</sup> One can find articles expressing similar views written by Xu Shiquan, Yu Keli, Xu Bodong, Zhang Nianchi, Li Jiaquan, Su Ge, Xin Qi, etc. The following is a list of sentences summarizing some of their typical beliefs.<sup>49</sup>

As long as Taiwan acknowledges that both sides belong to “one country,” the mainland is willing to give the most autonomy to Taiwan. The extent of autonomy and the rights [of its citizens and government] it entails are unprecedented in the world.

No one kind of Taiwanese independence scheme would come to a good end [任何形式的台獨圖謀都不會得逞].

The elements of Taiwanese independence [台獨份子] gathered to rectify Chinese names. Suddenly, the sun was covered with dark clouds, the air was dirty and the earth was dusty [烏雲蔽日，昏天黑地].

No one can get away with any word game to avoid and blur the one-China principle. To deny the one-China principle is to make war. The Taipei regime needs to wake up [and smell the tea], rectify its course, and we would welcome [it] as the lost son.

I hope war won't break out between the two sides, but if it does, Taiwan will be unified with China.

We can see that the nationalism embodied in these intellectual writings is remarkably similar to that of the government. Again we see the threat and condescension. We see the unitary interpretation of China as the People's Republic of China and nothing else.

Intellectuals outside the official system have strong opinions as well.<sup>50</sup> They are even critical of the government, saying that the state is too weak and needs to be more aggressive toward the U.S. as well as the Taiwanese independence movement. Their strand of collectivistic ethnic nationalism can be found in books such as *China Can Say No* and *China Can Still Say No* by Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, et al.<sup>51</sup> Below is a summary of their beliefs.<sup>52</sup>

The American support of Taiwanese independence by allowing Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. and by sending aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait has aroused anti-American feelings in China.

The growth of the Taiwanese independence movement was facilitated by the Americans. Unlike the Iraqis, the Chinese are willing to fight the Americans rather than losing their territory.

It is impossible for the Taiwanese to achieve independence by getting more votes yet not getting into more trouble.

The question is not whether Taiwan should be unified with the Mainland, but when. There has to be a timetable.

The future China cannot be without Taiwan. Any Chinese leader who loses Taiwan will become a criminal in Chinese history.

No one can question Taiwan's future as part of China, not the Chinese in Taiwan, nor the Chinese in the mainland, because it has always been part of China. Unification is a precondition; it cannot be discussed.

Taiwan's life and death are the Chinese nation's life and death. Taiwan's future is China's future.

Wang Xiaodong, Yang Fan, and Yan Xuetong also express similar ideas.<sup>53</sup> From the statements of both the government and its organic intellectuals, we can discern a number of things about nationalism, intellectuals, and China's Taiwan and U.S. policy making.

First, this nationalism, backed by the state and many intellectuals, is a collectivistic ethnic nationalism that emphasizes an unconditional unification that says little about human rights or democracy, unlike individualistic ethnic nationalism. The lack of development in the latter, however, has apparently contributed to the lack of confidence in the CCP government on the part of the Taiwanese, which in turn impedes unification. Wang Xiaodong would claim that he believes in human rights, but his advocacy of such nationalism has overshadowed his claim on human rights.<sup>54</sup>

Second, this nationalism gives forth a kind of arrogance toward Taiwan, which is reflected both in the central government's and many intellectuals' condescending attitudes. It is arrogant in the sense that it is exclusive. For them there can only be one way of unification, that is, the subjugation of the small by the big, typical of collectivistic ethnic nationalism. The development of Taiwanese consciousness during the Japanese colonization and under the KMT rule can be ignored, and its adherents can be called derogatively "elements of Taiwanese independence." As Zhang Xuezhong would tell us, the Chinese should guard against any kind of "cleverly camouflaged seeming unification but real independence." They should guard against any leaders who might want to make too much compromise.<sup>55</sup>

Third, this nationalism would encourage the use of force for the purpose of unification. Its adherents, including both the state and many intellectuals, believe that unification is good for China and the Chinese people. To get where they want

to be quickly, they have to resort to the most effective means, including war. Of course, they would claim that they want peaceful unification, but to achieve it, they have to develop China's military power and be ready to use force so as to contain Taiwan independence. If the U.S. wants to intervene when war breaks out, it has to consider the consequences of a nuclear warfare with China.<sup>56</sup> That is what is meant by Wen Jiabao's statement that the Chinese will defend the integrity of the country at all costs. Being ready to use force is the only way to deter Taiwan independence, according to these theorists. As the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China's military power acknowledges, Chinese leaders believe that "however much China does not wish to attack Taiwan, it needs to be prepared to do so for the nonmilitary components of its strategy to be sufficiently persuasive."

Fourth, this eagerness to develop and prepare to use military might is based on intellectuals' *increasing acceptance of political realism in international relations*, which is very nationalistic in nature; they mostly emphasize national interests. More scholars believe that with its military strategy of "preemptive strike," the U.S. has been practicing a neo-imperialism<sup>57</sup> and has become a "rogue super power."<sup>58</sup> In order to maintain its hegemony in the world, especially in the Asian Pacific region, the U.S. has to contain emerging powers like China.<sup>59</sup> The series of incidents in recent years (the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision of the U.S. spy plane with a Chinese fighter jet in 2001) and the continued arms sales to Taiwan by the U.S. have reinforced that impression.<sup>60</sup> When George W. Bush said in 2001 that the U.S. would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan, the U.S. as a threat to China's unification became clear.<sup>61</sup> As the above mentioned U.S. Department of Defense report summarizes, "At present, according to a variety of official and semiofficial publications, China views the United States as the only country that poses a real military threat to China and the only country that can impose effective economic sanctions against the regime [for whatever purposes]."<sup>62</sup>

On the other hand, these scholars see that the U.S. also views China as a threat to its hegemony. Some hawks among the neo-conservatives, for example, think that China is a potential "hostile hegemony"<sup>63</sup> and will seek to replace the U.S. and become the dominating force in the Far East. They believe that China's political and religious underpinnings, different from those of the U.S., will make it "a new evil empire."<sup>64</sup> Their views also reflect the anxiety among ordinary Americans over China as a serious problem, threat, or enemy state.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, "with the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, public attitudes toward China changed from favorable to divided, leaning toward unfavorable—where they have stayed for over a decade."<sup>66</sup> Even the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission holds the above beliefs in its 2004 annual report.<sup>67</sup>

Based on our analyses to date, as documented in detail in our Report, the Commission believes that a number of the current trends in U.S.-China relations have *negative implications* for our long-term economic and national security interests, and therefore that U.S. policies in these areas are in need of urgent attention and course corrections.

The Commission recommends that Congress and the administration work jointly to assess the developments across the Taiwan Strait and in Hong Kong and that Congress should enhance its oversight role in the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. The recommendations would include a reassessment of the U.S.'s one-China policy, "given the changing realities in China and Taiwan."

Therefore, if war breaks out across the Taiwan Strait, it will be a war between Chinese, Taiwanese, and American nationalisms, which are collectivistic ethnic in nature. It is true that the antiterrorist war has largely distracted the U.S. from its focus on China as a threat, but many nationalist factors remain over the Taiwan issue that may still draw the three parties into a hot war.<sup>68</sup>

Finally, there is remarkable agreement between the state and these intellectuals on their nationalistic stance over the Taiwan issue and their nationalistic attitudes toward the U.S. One can safely assume that this collectivistic ethnic nationalism and its organic intellectuals have played a major role in influencing China's Taiwan and U.S. policy, even if it may be impossible to quantify that influence. My interviews with some Taiwan and international studies scholars also seem to indicate the same.<sup>69</sup>

#### **4. The Influence of Individualistic Ethnic Nationalism and Critical Intellectuals in China's U.S. Policy Making**

As we discussed earlier, while collectivistic ethnic nationalism emphasizes national unity and sovereignty, an individualistic ethnic nationalism, or liberal nationalism, would emphasize equality, human rights, and democracy, as well as the interests of the ethnic/national groups. Lucian Pye asks what kind of a nation-state the Chinese people and their leaders are shaping for themselves as they enter the second century of the Chinese revolution.<sup>70</sup> This is the same question others in cultural China are asking. It is still a question about Confucian China and its modern fate, as the title of Levenson's 1965 book aptly points out.<sup>71</sup> If the Chinese are intent on building a democratic nation that respects human rights but that also respects ethnic/national rights, the government's Taiwan and U.S. policy making can be different.

On the issues of national identity conflict, or unification and independence, an individualistic ethnic nationalism would be concerned first about fairness, justice, human rights and democracy. The questions it asks would be: who would benefit

from any such political arrangement? What good does it do to ordinary people on the street? Here it may be worthwhile to quote Gandhi in full:

Recall the fate of the poorest and the most helpless man whom you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him, will he be able to gain anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to “swaraj” or self-rule for the hungry and spiritually starved millions of our countrymen? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melting away.<sup>72</sup>

Like Gandhi, intellectuals who believe in an individualistic ethnic nationalism would ask what might be most beneficial to ordinary people on the street. They would put civic consciousness and civil rights and responsibilities before ethnic blood ties or cultural heritages, although the latter would not be sacrificed, either.<sup>73</sup> They would focus on advancing both the individual and collective rights. This is different from the state’s collectivistic ethnic nationalism, which emphasizes rights of the collectivity, either in the form of the nation or the state. We call them critical intellectuals.

These intellectuals would be critical of an overly aggressive stance against the Taiwanese independence movement. They would be empathetic to and appreciative of the democratic developments in Taiwan. They would also be critical of anti-Westernism, believing that the so-called anti-Western intellectuals were greatly distorting Western civilization, ignorant about what was happening in the West.<sup>74</sup> Such radicalism is no cure for China’s illness and can be used by the ruling class to resist further social change.<sup>75</sup>

Chinese leaders may also occasionally show this appreciation of Taiwanese democracy: “We respect the Taiwanese people’s rights to become their own masters.” At the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in March 2005, President Hu Jintao also said that peaceful unification does not mean that one will devour the other. Instead, the two sides will negotiate their differences and the future of China on an equal basis. This sense of equality is also the spirit of democracy, even though Hu did not mention democracy or human rights in his speech.

Indeed, even those who are politically realistic point out the need for political reform as a way to offset the challenges from Taiwan and the U.S. Shi Yinzhong,<sup>76</sup> for example, believes that only a democratic political system can increase the confidence of Chinese people in the world, win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people, and offset pressure from the Americans. Zhang Xuezhong,<sup>77</sup> who is against any compromise on the Taiwan issue, thinks that the most important thing in China now is to quicken the steps of political and legal reform. Others have also discussed the importance of human rights and democracy in (inter)national relations.<sup>78</sup> At a time when human rights and democracy issues

figure significantly in Beijing-Taipei and U.S.-China relations, it is reasonable to think that progress in these directions could drastically change China's Taiwan and U.S. policies.

Such nationalism would be more receptive to other forms of future cross-Strait relations. There are a number of options for future political arrangements, such as 1) the People's Republic of China (PRC) that covers Taiwan; 2) the "one country, two systems" formula; 3) an independent Taiwan Republic vs. the PRC; 4) a Republic of China (ROC) that covers the mainland; 5) a Chinese federation that includes both sides as equal entities; and 6) a confederation that includes both sides as equal entities. Options 1 to 4 would be based on a collectivistic ethnic nationalism, while options 5 and 6 can be based on an individualistic ethnic nationalism. In fact, a hybrid of federation and confederation might be more logical according to this nationalism. Here the hybrid can be defined as a political entity where both Taiwan and mainland China would share the Chinese sovereignty, and by so doing, each would lose some of it. For example, the PRC would have to agree to the ROC's seat in the UN, which would be characteristic of a confederation with each state having its own sovereignty, thus guaranteeing it a seat in the UN. But the ROC has to promise, constitutionally, not to break away from the confederation, which would be characteristic of a federation, with each state being a part of the nation.<sup>79</sup> This way, nationalist feelings from mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S., human rights, and democracy might all be taken into consideration.

But such a political arrangement might invite criticism from those who adhere to collectivistic ethnic nationalism. As we mentioned earlier, Zhang Xuezhong<sup>80</sup> was against any compromises, including an arrangement of seeming unification but actual independence, of which this hybrid may be charged. Historically it has always been safer to be on the more nationalistic side. Premier Zhou Enlai was criticized by Mao as practicing capitulationism when he was making compromises with the U.S. in the negotiations with the Nixon administration in the 1970s.<sup>81</sup> Different opinions than that of the state on the issue of Taiwan and the U.S. have been more or less taboo. The influence of such nationalism is very limited.<sup>82</sup>

Nonetheless, an individualistic ethnic nationalism may shed light on alternatives to either a simple unification or a simple independence and calls into question any simplified solutions (see also Zhang Nianchi 2004 for a similar point).<sup>83</sup> Such a way of thinking will definitely change China's U.S. policy making toward being more conciliatory and conducive to a peaceful resolution, a goal all parties seem to assert as their own.

## **5. Conclusions: The Implications of These Nationalisms in China's U.S. Policy Making for War and Peace**

A cloud of war is hanging over the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese state and many of its intellectuals, like Yan Xuetong<sup>84</sup> and Zhang Xuezhong,<sup>85</sup> would of course prefer to avoid war, but if they have to fight to protect China's sovereignty, they will.

Instead of a hot war, China could use a naval blockade of Taiwan as one of PLA's military options. As the above mentioned U.S. Department of Defense's annual report points out,

The least hostile blockade option would be one enforced in the South and East China Seas that compelled Taiwan-bound ships to stop in mainland ports for inspections. The most effective blockade would involve direct action against major Taiwan ports such as declaring and enforcing closure areas in port approaches, mining ports and roadsteads, attacking ships approaching the ports, sinking ships in port channels, or destroying port facilities.<sup>86</sup>

On the other hand, the U.S. is unlikely to give up Taiwan easily. Ever since the end of World War II when Taiwan was returned to China, the U.S. has always understood the strategic importance of Taiwan. Indeed, Taiwan played a major role in the Cold War and has been used by the U.S. as what MacArthur called the unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine base, in reality at one time and figuratively now.<sup>87</sup> It continues to play a crucial role as described by the U.S. Department of Defense's, quoted at the beginning of this article. As one Taiwan studies scholar I interviewed observes, the U.S. is unlikely to give up Taiwan as its sphere of influence unless China can give the U.S. something in return.

Thus a war and/or blockade may be necessitated by the interaction of a Chinese nationalism that believes Taiwan is part of China, a Taiwanese nationalism that believes that it is not, and an American nationalism that believes Taiwan is part of its own sphere of influence.<sup>88</sup> All of these nationalisms are forms of collectivistic ethnic nationalism, and unless each can yield something to the other, as an individualistic ethnic nationalism would require, war may be inevitable.

On the other hand, in the U.S.'s China policy making, as in other nation-state's policy making, there is often an element of idealism, which was especially manifest in the Carter and Clinton administrations. This idealism emphasizes human rights and democracy,<sup>89</sup> just as individualistic ethnic nationalism does. Even in the current Bush administration of neo-conservatism and political realism, as we discussed earlier, some idealism still exists. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommends in its 2004 report.<sup>90</sup>

Congress should consult with the administration on developing appropriate ways for the United States to facilitate actively cross-Strait dialogue that could promote the

long-term, peaceful resolution of differences between the two sides and could lead to direct trade and transport links and/or other cross-Strait confidence-building measures. The administration should be directed to report to Congress on the status of cross-Strait dialogue, the current obstacles to such dialogue, and, if appropriate, efforts that the United States could undertake to promote such a dialogue.

Such a stance is evidently different from the narrower collectivistic ethnic American nationalistic stance, as the quote from the Department of Defense at the beginning of the article indicates.

Likewise, an individualistic ethnic nationalism on China's part can also bring forth a different response, which would emphasize equality, human rights and democracy, and an idealistic approach. It can not only help improve China's democratic politics, but also its foreign relations. Rather than having its policy directed by other great powers or the Taiwan independence movement, the Chinese government can take the initiative in setting a new path. This might be difficult, but it should be more appealing than war. A new approach based on individualistic ethnic nationalism has the potential to transform China's U.S. policy. The direction China goes domestically and internationally regarding its Taiwan and U.S. policy depends on the interaction between the two nationalisms we have discussed in this article. It is, ultimately, a matter of war and peace.

In sum, nationalism, as an invisible and inevitable social factor, is a significant underlying force that affects every government's (inter)national policy making. What can make a difference is what kind of nationalism the government is practicing, collectivistic ethnic or individualistic ethnic. The former emphasizes unity of ethnicity while the latter emphasizes not only unity but also equality, human rights and democracy. In the Chinese case, it seems that collectivistic ethnic nationalism is taking a primary role in the government's U.S. policy making with regard to Taiwan, although occasionally there is an element of individualistic ethnic nationalism, which shows respect for equality, human rights, and democracy.

The Chinese government and intellectuals in the epistemic community are split between two kinds of nationalism. The same applies to intellectuals or government officials as individuals, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao notwithstanding. In China's Taiwan and U.S. policy making, the voice of collectivistic ethnic nationalism is louder than that of individualistic ethnic nationalism.<sup>91</sup> Which opinion gets the upper hand is the result of the power dynamics played among various societal and political forces, for example, the Chinese government policy makers, the epistemic communities, and their reconciliation between different nationalisms, as well as other national and international governments and interest groups, economic, political (that is, social movements of unification or independence), military, or otherwise.<sup>92</sup> In other words, the outcome of cross-Strait relations, of the relations between China and the U.S., or of war and peace among all the parties involved hinges on whose voice is being heard, accepted, and practiced.<sup>93</sup>

## Notes

- 1 This chapter is based partly on a manuscript written as a Fulbright Scholar project in 2003. The author would like to thank the Fulbright Program for providing all the support for the research, and the colleagues at Academia Sinica in Taiwan for their enlightenment and criticisms of the ideas in the paper. For the insights in this chapter, the author would also like to thank Professors Yufan Hao, Lin Su and others who participated in a meeting planning this edited volume at Renmin University in Beijing in June 2004. Professor Hao's suggestions for revision on the draft later have helped me greatly strengthen my arguments. Professor Richard Baum also read and commented on the paper when I presented it at a conference on national identity and future cross-Strait relations at the University of Macau in December 2004. His comments have also helped greatly with the revision of the paper. Thanks also go to Sheng Si-xin, a graduate student at the University of Macau, who assisted with the preparation of the footnotes and bibliography. Any errors are, of course, mine. To contact me, please email to [zdhao@umac.mo](mailto:zdhao@umac.mo).
- 2 See <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf> [28 January 2005].
- 3 We will come back to ethics later in the chapter when we discuss individualistic ethnic nationalism and idealism in foreign relations.
- 4 To neutralize the connotations of these words, we treat China, mainland China, and People's Republic of China (PRC) interchangeably, and likewise with Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC). Whichever term is used, it refers to a political entity that shares some historical and cultural traits with the other across the Strait but also differs from it in its current political system. However, the term "China" can also refer to a cultural and historical entity that can cover both the mainland and Taiwan. In this sense, one can argue that Taiwan can be part of China but not part of the PRC. China is bigger than the PRC. The terms are used with all these complexities in mind.
- 5 These are the Joint U.S.-China Communiqué, Shanghai (1972), often called the Shanghai Communiqué, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979), and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué (1982). The U.S. also acknowledges that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China. In that sense, one may argue that the China the U.S. acknowledges is more than the PRC.
- 6 See Part C of Section 3 of the Act.
- 7 See Hu Weixing, "Baoshou Zhuyi yu Mei Zhong Guanxi: Cong Ligen Kan Xiao Bushi de Dui Tai Zhengce" (Conservatism and the relationship between the U.S. and China: a look into Bush Jr.'s Taiwan policy from the perspective of Reagan), in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.), *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy) (Shanghai: Sanlian Press, 2003), pp. 365-86.
- 8 The intellectuals in the Taiwan studies and international studies circles I interviewed for this article include Jia Qingguo of Peking University, Jin Canrong and Huang Jiashu of the People's University in Beijing, Yu Keli of the Taiwan Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xu Bodong of the Beijing United University, and Li Fei and Li Peng of Xiaman University.
- 9 We will further define nationalism in the following section. We only formally introduce the topic here. For more discussions on the complexity of nationalism, see the following

- books as well as other works cited elsewhere in this article: Hong Quanhu and Xie Zhenglun (eds.), *Bai Nian lai Liangan Minzuzhuyi de Fazhan yu Fanxing* (The development of and reflection on nationalism across the Taiwan Strait in the past hundred years) (Taipei: Dongwu University, 2002); Liu Qingfeng (ed.), *Minzuzhuyi yu Zhongguo Xiandaihua* (Nationalism and China's modernization) (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1994); Luo Zhitian, *Minzuzhuyi yu Jindai Zhongguo Sixiang* (Nationalism and modern Chinese thoughts) (Taipei: Dongwu University, 1998); and Xu Xun, *Minzuzhuyi* (Nationalism) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1998).
- 10 See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Missing in Action: Truth," *New York Times*, 6 March 2003.
  - 11 See Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.), *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy) (Shanghai: Sanlian Press, 2003).
  - 12 This American patriotism, or nationalism, is also reflected in the voting of the U.S. congressmen and women over the "USA Patriot Act" of 2001. The Act gives broad power to the president and the attorney general, and relaxes many rules that used to protect people from unfair investigation and prosecution. The president can order any non-US citizen to be tried, at his sole discretion, by a military tribunal rather than in an ordinary criminal court. Yet, it passed the Senate with only one dissenting vote out of 100 senators, and sixty-six dissenting votes in the House with over 400 representatives (see Ronald Dworkin, "The Threat to Patriotism," *The New York Review of Books*, 28 February 2002).
  - 13 For the example of Chinese government-sponsored patriotism in the post-June 4 China, see Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China* (London: Ashgate, 2000).
  - 14 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 162. Citing Chateaubriand and Walker Connor.
  - 15 See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edn. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 141.
  - 16 *Ibid.*, p. 141.
  - 17 See Earnes Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 58. For more discussion on this issue between ethnic groups, see Wang Fu-chang, *Dangdai Taiwan Shehui de Zuqun Xiangxiang* (The contemporary Taiwanese society's ethnic imagination) (Taipei: National Taiwan University), p. 76.
  - 18 See also Zheng Yongnian, "Zhongguo Xin Yi Bo Minzu Zhuyi" (The new wave of nationalism in China), in Lin Chia-lung and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *Minzu Zhuyi yu Lian'an Guanxi* (Nationalism and the cross-Strait relations) (Taipei: Xin Zirang Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2001), pp. 29-30. Gellner thinks of nationalism as "a very distinctive species of patriotism," based on cultural homogeneity, groups striving to keep a literate culture going, and anonymous, fluid, mobile, and unmediated populations. So he equates nationalism with patriotism. We agree with him, but we are also saying that patriotism is derived from nationalism, although as feelings and ideology it is not always clear which comes first. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 138.
  - 19 See also Pei Minxin, "Meiguo Minzuzhuyi de Beilun" (The paradox of American

- nationalism), *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management), 3 (2003): 51-54, for a fuller discussion on American nationalism.
- 20 See Wu Yi, “Wu Yi zai Di 56 Jie Shijie Weisheng Dahui Zongwu Weiyuanhui Shenyi.” She Tai Ti An Shi de Fayan” (Wu Yi’s speech on the General Committee meeting of the 56th World Health Organization Conference), (2003). [www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20030520/996742.html](http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20030520/996742.html) [28 January 2005].
  - 21 For more discussion on the difficulties, frustrations, feelings of disrespect and anger caused by a situation similar to this, see also Wang, Horng-luen, “Taiwan Weihe Yao Zi Zhao Mafan” (Why does Taiwan want to “make trouble for itself?” in Lin Chia-lung and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *Minzu Zhuyi yu Lian’an Guanxi* (Nationalism and the cross-Strait relations), pp. 267-301.
  - 22 See Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 153-60.
  - 23 See *Ibid.*, p. 154.
  - 24 See *Ibid.*, p. 155.
  - 25 For this and the following quotes, see Anatol Lieven, “The Push for War,” *London Review of Books* 24(19), 3 October 2002.
  - 26 See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1.
  - 27 See John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 2; Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin, “Introduction: Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin (eds.), *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 4.
  - 28 Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p. 6.
  - 29 See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 1991.
  - 30 Cited in Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv, “Asia in Theories of Nationalism and National Identity,” in Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (eds.), *Asian Forms of the Nation* (London: Curzon, 1996).
  - 31 See John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 1993, p.8.
  - 32 See E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Second edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 125-7.
  - 33 See Liah Greenfeld, “Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Nationalism,” in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin (eds.) *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 31-4.
  - 34 See Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China*, p. 45; Jiang Yi-hua , *Ziyou Zhuyi, Minzu Zhuyi, yu Guojia Rentong* (Liberalism, nationalism, and national identity) (Taipei: Yangzhi Wenhua , 1998), pp. 156-7, 161-76, 189-202; Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, pp. 125-7.
  - 35 See Smith, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 101-2.
  - 36 See Greenfeld, “Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Nationalism,” p. 36.
  - 37 See Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
  - 38 See below our discussion on collectivistic ethnic nationalism.
  - 39 See Greenfeld, “Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Nationalism,” p. 32.

- 40 See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*; and Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, pp. 125-7.
- 41 See Greenfeld, "Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Nationalism," p. 33.
- 42 Wang Fu-chang, "Taiwan Fandui Yundong de Gongshi Dongyuan: Yi Jiu Qi Jiu zhi Yi Jiu Ba Jiu Nian Liangci Tiaozhan Gaofeng de Bijiao" (Consensus mobilization of the political opposition in Taiwan: comparing two waves of challenges, 1979-1989), *Taiwan Zhengzhi Xuekan* (Journal of Taiwan political science), 1 (1996): 183-5.
- 43 Chang Mau-kuei, "Toward an Understanding of the *Sheng-chi Wen-ti* in Taiwan: Focusing on Changes after Political Liberalization," in Cheng Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, and Huang Shu-min (eds.), *Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives* (Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), pp. 133; Li Xiao-feng, *Wu Bei Shi Gou* (We are dogs) (Taipei: Qianwei Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 157-61.
- 44 To be sure, human rights and democracy have entered the Chinese political discourse. But one may argue that they by no means have become the dominant discourse.
- 45 See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2004/china-040517.htm>. [January 28, 2005].
- 46 See [http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg/zywg0.asp?zywg\\_m\\_id=105](http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg/zywg0.asp?zywg_m_id=105). [January 28, 2005].
- 47 For the set of quotes below, see Wu Yi, 2003.
- 48 In a special issue of *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, entitled *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, edited by Peter M. Haas, in Winter, 1992, ten authors contributed articles exploring how the networks of experts, or epistemic communities, helped nation-states create, diffuse and perpetuate ideas and practices. Their studies indicate that although state decisions are often based on political considerations, rather than experts' professional judgements, the epistemic communities have nonetheless often played a significant role in state policy making. Similarly, the September 2002 issue of *The China Quarterly* published five articles exploring how the Chinese epistemic communities influenced China's international, military, economic and public security policies. In this volume, Professor Quansheng Zhao again discusses how Chinese intellectuals and think tanks in and outside the the government make an effort to influence its foreign policymaking. While all these works focus on the role of intellectuals in a state's policymaking, my article focuses on the role of nationalism as espoused by two kinds of intellectuals or intellectual tendencies: one in support of collectivistic ethnic nationalism, and the other in support of individualistic ethnic nationalism. All of these intellectuals are part of the epistemic community, which is aparently split in its opinions. How they each strive to influence the government policy toward the U.S. in regard to Taiwan with their own nationalisms and how effective each of them are is the topic of another worthwhile research project. It will also be interesting to explore the reciprocal relationship between intellectuals and the state in this regard. For the same point, see also my 2003 book, *Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China's Knowledge Workers*, where I discussed the dynamic relationship between the state on one hand and organic, professional, and critical intellectuals on the other.
- 49 These expressions are taken from the websites <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/TCC/haixia/17072.htm>, and

- [http://www.chinataiwan.org/webportal/portal.po?UID=DWV1\\_WOUID\\_URL\\_2001006](http://www.chinataiwan.org/webportal/portal.po?UID=DWV1_WOUID_URL_2001006) [January 30, 2005]. I am not quoting the specific authors for two reasons. First, these are sentences summarizing the typical beliefs of such intellectuals and can be found in typical official articles written by them. Second, to attach statements to specific authors run the risks of stereotyping them. In fact, individuals' views are dynamic rather than static. I do not want to cast them in one voice and as having only one view. Both the two kinds of nationalisms and the two kinds of intellectuals supporting them are ideal types, not straitjackets for governments or intellectuals to wear. It is the dynamics between types that I want to emphasize, although I do discuss them in types.
- 50 This refers to those who are not part of the think tank that provides policy suggestions to the government. They tend to be situated in colleges and universities.
  - 51 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, et al., *Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu* (China can say no) (Hong Kong: Ming Bao Press, 1996); *Zhongguo Haishi Neng Shuo Bu* (China can still say no) (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenlian Chubanshe or Chinese art and literature association press, 1996).
  - 52 This is a summary of the main sentiments of the nationalism embodied in these intellectuals. Although I am again not quoting the specific authors of these words, such sentiments permeate these texts.
  - 53 See a discussion between Wang Xiaodong, Wang Wencheng, Han Deqiang, Qin Hui, Ding Dong, Yang Fan, etc. at <http://www1.cei.gov.cn/economist/doc/xryf/200108211506.htm> [30 January 2005]; see also an article on Yang Fang and his views on Taiwan independence at <http://www.cc.org.cn/luntan/china/login.php3?db=1> [October 4, 2003].
  - 54 See <http://www1.cei.gov.cn/economist/doc/xryf/200108211506.htm> [January 30, 2005].
  - 55 See Zhang Xuezhong, “Fangzhi Taiwan Wenti Chuxian Zui Huai Jumian de Duice Sikao” (Thoughts on how to prevent the worst case scenario on the Taiwan issue), *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management), 3 (2004): 7.
  - 56 See Yan Xuetong, “Wuli Ezhi Tai Du Fali Duli de Li Bi Fenxi” (The pros and cons of a military containment of the legal independence of Taiwan), *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management), 3 (2004): 1-5.
  - 57 See Shen Dingli, “Ping ‘Xin Diguo lun’ jiqi Queshi” (On the concept of “neo-imperialism” and its shortcomings), in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.) *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. Foreign Policy), pp. 159-173; Xin Benjian, “Meiguo Xin Baoshou Pai yu Bushi Zhengfu de ‘Xin Diguo Da Zhanlue’” (The American neo-conservatives and the Bush administration’s “new empire strategy”), *Er Shi Yi Shiji Shuang Yue Kan* (Twenty-first Century Bimonthly), 4 (2003): 4-15.
  - 58 According to Zhang Ming, the term “rogue super power” referring to the U.S. is first used by Samuel Huntington. See his “Zongjiao Wenhua yu Meiguo Waijiao zhong de Daode Lixiang Zhuyi” (The culture of religion and the moral idealism in the U.S.’s foreign policy), in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.) *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy), p. 254.
  - 59 See Cai Jiahe, “Baidong zhong de Huigui: Baoshou Zhuyi Sichao dui G.W. Bushi Zhengfu du Wai Zhengce de Yingxiang” (The return of the policy: the influence of conservatism in the G.W. Bush administration’s foreign policy), in Ren Xiao and Shen

- Dingli (eds.), *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy), pp. 176-98.
- 60 For the effect of the embassy bombing and spy plane collision in arousing the Chinese nationalist feelings and causing the Chinese to reevaluate Western civilization and to find their own positions, see also Joseph Cheng and Kinglun Ngok, "Chinese Nationalism and Sino-US Relations: the NATO Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade," in Leong H. Liew and Shaoguang Wang (eds.), *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Hao Zhidong, "Jiushi Niandai de Minzu Zhuyi he Zhongguo de Zhishi Fenzi" (Nationalism in the 1990s and China's intellectuals), in Lin Gang and Cheng Weixing (eds.), *Taihai Liang'an de Fazhan Qianjing* (Prospects for cross-Taiwan development) (Hong Kong: Yazhou Kexue Chupanshe, 2000) on nationalism in the 1990s and early 2000s; and Ben Hillman, "Chinese nationalism and the Belgrade embassy bombing," in Liew and Wang (eds.), *Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration*.
- 61 See Zhang Jiadong, "*Qianlun Xin Baoshou Zhuyi ji dui Meiguo Duihua Zhengce de Yingxiang*" (On neo-conservatism and its influence on the U.S.'s China policy). in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli edited *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy), pp. 345-64; Pan Zhongqi, "*Lue Lun Meiguo Baoshou Shili zai Meiguo Dui Tai Zhengce zhong de Zuoyong*" (On the influence of American conservatism in the U.S.'s policy toward Taiwan), in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.) *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy), pp. 387-405.
- 62 See <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf> [30 January 2005].
- 63 See Pan Yining, "*Shixi Meiguo Jiduan Baoshou Sixiang dui Zhongmei Guanxi de Yingxiang*" (On the influence radical conservatism in China-U.S. relations) in Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli (eds.), *Baoshouzhuyi Linian yu Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce* (Conservatism and U.S. foreign policy), p. 334.
- 64 See *Ibid.*, p. 336.
- 65 See *Ibid.*, p. 338; Shi Yinhong, "*Zhongguo de Waibu Kunnan he Xin Lingdao Jiti Miandui de Tiaozhan*" (China's external difficulties and the challenges facing the new collective leadership). *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management), 3 (2003): 34-9.
- 66 See [http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional\\_issues/china/ch\\_summary.cfm](http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/china/ch_summary.cfm) [January 30, 2005].
- 67 See [http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/04annual\\_report.htm](http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/04annual_report.htm) [10 October 2004].
- 68 See Michael Swaine, "*Mei Zhong Guanxi Haozhuan yu Taiwan Wenti*" (The improvement of U.S.-China relations and the Taiwan issue), *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management), 3 (2003): 46-50; Wang Jisi, "*Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue de Tiaozheng jiqi dui Zhongmei Guanxi de Yingxiang*" (The adjustment of U.S.'s global strategy and its influence on China-U.S. relations) (Beijing: Workshop on international studies in China, 13 June 2004).
- 69 Professor Quansheng Zhao's article in this volume also illustrates the connection between government policymaking and the views of organic intellectuals.
- 70 See Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism Was Shanghai'd," in Jonathan Unger (eds.), *Chinese Nationalism* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 86-112.

- 71 See Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
- 72 Cited by Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 95.
- 73 See Jiang Yi-hua, *Ziyou Zhuyi, Minzu Zhuyi, yu Guojia Rentong*, pp. 163.
- 74 See Ling Zhijun and Ma Licheng, *Huhan: Dangjin Zhongguo de Wuzhong Shengyin* (Calling out: five voices in con-temporary China) (Guangzhou: Guangzhou Press, 1999), pp. 264-326; Liu Xiaobo, “Jiushi Niandai Zhongguo de Jiduan Minzu Zhuyi” (Radical nationalism in the China of 1990s), *Beijing Spring*, 1 (1997).
- 75 See He Jiadong, “Zhongguo Wenti Yujing xia de Zhuyi zhi Zheng” (The debate on isms in the context of China’s problems), *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (Strategy and management), 6 (2000); Xiao Gongqin, “Wei Shemo Wo Fandui Jijin Minzu Zhuyi” (Why I am opposed to radical nationalism), *Ershi Yi Shiji* (Twenty-first century), 54 (1999); Xu Jilin, *Xunqiu Yiyi* (Searching for meaning) (Shanghai: Sanlian Bookstore, 1997).
- 76 See Shi Yin hong, “Zhongguo de Waibu Kunnan he Xin Lingdao Jiti Miandui de Tiaozhan”, 2003, p. 39.
- 77 See Zhang Xuezhong, “Fangzhi Taiwan Wenti Chuxian Zui Huai Jumian de Duice Sikao”, 2004, p. 7.
- 78 See Wang Yizhou, “Quanqihua yu Dangjin Shijie: Dui Quanqiu Zhengzhi ji Zhongguo Waijiao de Jidian Sikao” (Globalization and today’s world: some thoughts on global politics and China’s foreign policy) (Beijing: Workshop on international studies in China, June 13, 2004); Huang Jiashu, “Taiwan Wenti Zouxiang” (The trends on the Taiwan issue) (Beijing: Workshop on international studies in China, 13 June 2004).
- 79 For the need for creative ideas and the possibility of a confederation, see also (1) Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, “Cross-Strait Tensions and Their Impact on Taiwan’s Domestic Politics and Security Policy,” a paper presented at the conference on Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe, Taipei, Taiwan, December 8-9, 2003; (2) Chang Yachung, *Liang An Tong He Lun* (On the unification of the two sides across the Taiwan Strait) (Taipei: Sheng Zhi Wenhua Shiye Youxian Gongsi, 2000); (3) Chen Yu-jun, *Zhong Mei Tai Feng Yun Lu* (The vicissitudes in the relationship between China, the U.S., and Taiwan: from the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait to the confrontation between China and the U.S.) (Hong Kong: Haixia Xueshu Press, 2001); (4) Fei Xiping in Nan Fang Shuo, “Yizhong Jiji de Xin Taidu” (A positive new attitude), pp. 246-60 in Ohamae Kenichi, *Zhonghua Lianbang* (The Emergence of the United States of Chunghwa) (Taipei: Shang Zhou Chuban, 2003); (5) Ge Yong-guang, *Wenhua Duoyuan Zhuyi yu Guojia Zhenghe: Jianlun Zhongguo Rentong de Xingcheng yu Tiaozhan* (Multiculturalism and reorganization of the state: the formation and challenges of the Chinese identity) (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co. Ltd., 1991); (6) Kinderman, Gottfried-Karl, “Cases of Successful Rapprochement and Integration and a Roadmap to Cross-Strait Rapprochement,” a paper presented at the conference on Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe, Taipei, Taiwan, December 8-9, 2003; (7) Shi Ming-Teh, *Qiu Shi zhi Chun* (The spring in the prison cell) (Taipei: Dunli Chubanshe 1990); (8) Wei Yung, “Maixiang Minzu nei Gongtongti: Tai Hai Liang’an Hudong Moshi zhi Jiangou, Fazhan yu Jiayan” (Toward an “intra-national union:” theoretical models on cross-Taiwan Strait interaction), *Mainland China Studies* 45/5 (2002): 1-55; (9) Yan Jiaqi, *Di San Guohe: Weilei Zhongguo de Xuanze* (The third

- republic: the choice of the future China) (Taipei: Shibao Wenhua Chuban Qiye Youxian Gongsi, 1992).
- 80 See Zhang Xuezhong, “*Fangzhi Taiwan Wenti Chuxian Zui Huai Jumian de Duice Sikao*”, 2004, p. 7.
- 81 See Gao Wenqian, *Wannian Zhou Enlai* (The final years of Zhou Enlai) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2003).
- 82 As I said earlier, further research needs to be done on specifically how and to what extent intellectuals believing in individualistic ethnic nationalism can affect the state's U.S. policy making with regard to Taiwan.
- 83 For Zhang's view, see *Qiao Bao* (Overseas Chinese daily), A6, March 30, 2004.
- 84 See Yan Xuotong, “*Wuli Ezhi Tai Du Fali Duli de Li Bi Fenxi*”, 2004, pp. 1-5.
- 85 See Zhang Xuezhong, “*Fangzhi Taiwan Wenti Chuxian Zui Huai Jumian de Duice Sikao*”, 2004, p. 7.
- 86 See <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf> [30 January 2005].
- 87 See Su Ge, “*Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti*” (The U.S.'s China policy and the Taiwan issue). (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), p. 146.
- 88 For this latter point, see also Su Ge (1998).
- 89 See Su Ge, “*Meiguo Dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti*”, 1998, pp. 400-2; 651-5.
- 90 See <http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/04reportpage2.pdf> [October 10, 2004].
- 91 The visible consistency between the government's position and that of its organic intellectuals is some evidence of the epistemically reciprocal relationship between the two, although more research still needs to be done on how specifically that works.
- 92 The negotiations between mainland China and Taiwan regarding the direct flights of charter planes from both sides in spring 2005 are a good example of how these dynamics were played out among different parties concerned. But studies are yet to be done on specific cross-Strait issues such as this and the role of various social forces in the processes of decision-making regarding them, as I implied earlier.
- 93 A research project on the link between the government policy makers and the epistemic communities, that is, how they influence one another, will be especially interesting.

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