CHAPTER ELEVEN

Germany and the West: the 'Rapallo Factor' in German Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s

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On 16 April 1922 German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau and Soviet Commissioner of Foreign Affairs Chicherin signed the Treaty of Rapallo. Immediately, there arose fears of a powerful bonding of the two spheres of interest which might also be accompanied by a concomitant weakening of German interest in its western neighbours.[1] Thus Rapallo came to symbolize for many the deviousness of a too-independent German foreign policy, as well as that country's unreliability and unpredictable yearning for great-power status. Statesmen everywhere were reminded of earlier prophecies of a Russo-German domination of Europe. This had been gloomily anticipated since the end of the German Wars of Liberation in 1814/15. Ever since, Germany's mythical hankering after a 'special relationship' with Russia has invoked fear and suspicion among its neighbours.[2] Rapallo became synonymous with the Western nightmare of close Soviet–German cooperation,[3] the more so

1. See Peter Krüger, 'A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy', in Carole Fink, Axel Frohn and Jürgen Heideking, eds, *Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 50.

2. See Rolf-Dieter Müller, 'Rapallo-Karriere eines Reizwortes', *Die Zeit* No. 16 (10/4/1992), p. 60.

3. The French but also the Americans were very alarmed, 'suspecting German ... intentions to monpolize the Russian market'. See Krüger, 'A Rainy Day', p. 57; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, 'Rappallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy: New Sources and New Interpretations', in Volker R. Berghahn and Martin Kitchen, eds, *Germany in the Age of Total War* (London, 1981), p. 123. See also Renata Bournazel, *Rapallo, ein französisches Trauma* (Cologne, 1976); Axel Frohn, 'Der "Rapallo-Mythos" und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen', in Jost Dülffer *et al.*, eds, *Deutschland und Europa: Kontinuität und Bruch* (Frankfurt, 1990), pp. 138–53.

as the treaty seemed to culminate in the Soviet–German non-aggression treaty of 1939 and resulted in Germany's attempted conquest of continental Europe. This, and the fear of another Rapallo, strongly influenced Western policy towards the Federal Republic of Germany immediately after the Second World War. It was once said: 'We all know that the Germans, whenever they join forces with the Russians, are soon afterwards on the outskirts of Paris.'[4]

Following a brief account of the events of 1922, this essay will examine the importance of the 'Rapallo complex'[5] in influencing West Germany's relations with the Western Allied powers in the post-Second World War era. The first, careful steps towards a rapprochement with Moscow were conducted under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer in the mid-1950s. Western reaction to Adenauer's Eastern policy, however, has been largely neglected in the literature and will therefore be examined. Western, and particularly American, suspicions that were aroused by Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in the late 1960s and early 1970s and also the initial British and French opposition to the process of German unification in 1989/90 will subsequently be analysed. Since German unification, the Federal Republic has been adopting an ever more active policy towards Eastern Europe. Germany's post-unification *Ostpolitik*, however, is not always regarded uncritically, and old fears and prejudices are sometimes reawakened. In its final part the article will therefore attempt to clarify whether these carefully voiced Western reservations are simply a result of the negative memories of the past or whether there is actually some justification for such fears. Can it be said that Germany is moving towards a policy of building up its Eastern links to the detriment of the country's Western relations? Has the newly united Germany perhaps commenced with a new *Schaukelpolitik* (policy of the swing) between East and West? Are German politicians and intelligentsia seriously reconsidering the usefulness of the Federal Republic's close links with the West as indicated in an influential book in the early 1990s?[6] In short, is the 'Rapallo complex' in Germany's relations with the Western world still a factor?

4. This was uttered by French High Commissioner André François-Poncet. Quoted in Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, 'The French View', in Edwina Moreton, ed., *Germany between East and West* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 74.

5. Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic* (London, 1988), p. 17.

6. Rainer Zitelmann *et al.*, eds, *Westbindung: Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1993).

RAPALLO 1922

The Treaty of Rapallo was signed on the occasion of the Genoa Conference, the world's first economic summit. It brought 28 states to the conference table with the purpose of re-ordering the world's economy, which was still suffering from the devastations and disruption caused by the First World War. The participating nations included Soviet Russia and Germany, who – for the first time since the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty – enjoyed parity with the other states attending the summit.[7] The USA did not attend as the French had insisted that the reparation issue be excluded from the agenda, though Germany hoped it would be able to introduce the topic indirectly. After all, the desire for the economic revival of Eastern and Central Europe was at the heart of the conference. The Poincaré government in France particularly, but also the Lloyd George government in London, which had initiated the Genoa Conference, and also, at times, the German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, wished to create an international economic and financial consortium consisting of France, Britain, Germany and Belgium to raise, distribute and control the finances necessary to rebuild Russia. The intention was to establish 'a united front . . . of all European states that had granted credits to pre-revolutionary Russia, or whose nationals had suffered losses due to socialization since the Bolsheviks assumed power'.[8] As this would almost inevitably have led to Soviet dependency on Western goodwill, the Russian government was not in favour of such a consortium. It regarded this multilateral Western attempt to obtain access to Soviet resources as a blatant, imperialist infringement of its sovereignty. The country was therefore keen on driving a rift between the assembled states, particularly between Britain and France, and subsequently concluding separate treaties with individual states.[9]

It is probably not entirely correct to talk of a carefully worked-out,

7. For the conference see Carole Fink, *The Genoa Conference: European Diplomacy, 1921–22* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984); and the various articles in Fink *et al.*, eds, *Genoa*. For the general background of German foreign policy at this time see Peter Krüger, *Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar* 2nd edn (Darmstadt, 1993), pp. 132ff., 151ff.

8. Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, p. 43. See also Wolfgang Michalka, 'Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1920–33', in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke and Hans-Adolf Jacobson, eds, *Die Weimarer Republik, 1918–33: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Bonn, 1987), pp. 310–11; Karl-Dietrich Erdmann, 'Deutschland, Rapallo und der Westen', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 11 (1963), 105–65.

9. Erdmann, 'Deutschland'; also Theodor Schieder, 'Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Rapallo-Vertrages', in *Historische Zeitschrift* 204 (1967), 555, 559.

'grand strategy' as the basis for German foreign policy at this stage.[10] There were other reasons for Berlin's interest in a rapprochement with Russia, apart from economic and financial ones. Germany wished to break out from its post-war diplomatic isolation. It hoped to obtain a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, for example concerning the territories lost to Poland, through cooperation with Lenin's government. Mutual hostility towards the newly re-created Poland and to the Polish–French alliance was certainly a factor in achieving this aim. A closer understanding with the Soviet Union might also provide useful leverage with the West in the matter of reparation payments. These payments had proved to be a heavy burden on the German economy.[11] Influential advisers in the government like Assistant State Secretary Ago von Maltzan, who was in effect running the German government's eastern policy, and Chief of Staff General Seekt favoured a more active German *Ostpolitik*. They particularly had an eye on closer military cooperation.[12] Moreover, Foreign Minister Rathenau himself was an influential industrialist who was very aware of the economic advantages of a close relationship with the Soviet Union. He had been working for such a development since 1919, though in 1922 Rathenau had continued to express doubts about entering into the treaty, until shortly before it had been signed.[13]

Despite this somewhat strange partnership between Lenin's revolutionary Soviet Union – still intent on exporting communism to the world – and capitalist Germany with its strong, right-wing political leanings, a Russo-German rapprochement should not have come as a surprise. Although events in the recent past had led to the deterioration and eventually cessation of political relations between the two, this development was soon reversed. After the war, both countries realized that they needed to escape from the diplomatic and economic isolation that had been imposed on them by the West in the aftermath of the war. In short, they could not afford to remain on unfriendly terms.[14] Moreover, by February 1920, European powers like Italy, Britain and France had become interested in exploring the huge export potential of Russia's large population. Soon 'the European race for Russia was on'

10. As indicated by Schieder: see 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 558. For a refutation of this view see Krüger, 'Rainy Day', p. 56.

11. See Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922–1923: Politics and Economics* (The Hague, 1979).

12. See Schieder, 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 549ff.; Marshall M. Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, *German Foreign Policy, 1917–1933: Continuity or Break?* (Leamington Spa, 1987), pp. 50ff.; Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', p. 138.

13. See Krüger, 'Rainy Day', pp. 56, 60.

14. See Lee and Michalka, *German Foreign Policy*, pp. 49ff.; John Hiden, *Germany and Europe, 1919–39* (London, 1977), pp. 86ff.

and Germany made sure that it was 'from the beginning a significant factor in Western economic initiatives in Russia'.[15] Ever-closer economic and, since 1920, increasing, though still limited, military cooperation took place. On 6 May 1921, this culminated in the signing of a Provisional Agreement between Germany and Russia. Almost immediately further attempts to improve relations were embarked upon. In the winter of 1921/22 they almost came to fruition. Unsuccessful negotiations took place in December/January, February and again between 2–4 April 1922 in Berlin. A five-point agreement had been worked out in February but not signed. Because of Germany's hesitation to rule out categorically the country's participation in the envisaged international consortium, the Soviet representative refused to sign. Both Rathenau and Chancellor Wirth were not too upset, not wishing to spoil relations with the Western powers before the Conference of Genoa. At this stage they may have hoped that Germany's membership of the consortium would enable the country to obtain a solution in its favour of the complicated reparation question. However, only two months later the substance of the document drawn up in February would become known to the world as the Treaty of Rapallo.[16]

Still, as Pogge von Strandmann has explained, 'in the last resort neither Rathenau nor Wirth really believed in an international consortium for developing Russia. They put German industry first and exploited the separate dealings of the allies to defend the German action.'[17] At Genoa the German delegation soon realized that negotiations between the Allied powers and the Soviet Union were not progressing too well. An agreement regarding a consortium was not imminent. The Allies might well be on the brink of asking the Germans to join the negotiations. On the insistence of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, and contrary to the initial intentions of the Allies, Germany had been excluded from the talks with the Russians. London believed that the envisaged solution involving a mutual renunciation of all Russian and Allied debts might encourage the Germans to ask for the same.[18]

When an invitation to join the negotiations seemed to be imminent, Ago von Maltzan, the mover behind the scenes, acted quickly by immediately approaching the Soviets. The Germans, and not the Soviets as has long been assumed, took the initiative.[19] Germany now declared

15. See Krüger, *Aussenpolitik*, p. 115; Lee and Michalka, *German Foreign Policy*, p. 51.
16. See Schieder, 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 565–6, 589; Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', pp. 124ff.; Lee and Michalka, *German Foreign Policy*, pp. 48ff.
17. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', p. 137.
18. See Krüger, 'Rainy Day', pp. 53–4.
19. Ibid., pp. 55–6.

it was prepared to sign an agreement based on the Berlin negotiations in February. The German government used the argument that the Allies had been about to sign an agreement with the Soviets that would have left Germany isolated as a pretext for its rapid signing of the treaty. Apart from reasons of economic cooperation, the government in Berlin wanted to demonstrate in a spectacular way that negotiations with the Soviet Union ought not to be conducted without German participation. The country regarded relations with Eastern Europe as its traditional domain. Maltzan had indeed embarked on 'pure power politics'.[20]

However, there were also domestic reasons for concluding the treaty with the Soviets quickly. For the German electorate, the Berlin government was synonymous with the highly unpopular policy of fulfilling the Versailles peace treaty. Demonstrating that it was capable of executing a strong policy which ran counter to the plans of the Allied powers would be much appreciated by the German public.[21] It is still a matter of controversy whether or not the government employed this strategy in the hope of actually signing the treaty in the course of the Genoa Conference, thus creating the strongest impact possible.[22] However, the conclusion of the treaty was 'by no means certain from the beginning and depended on many unforeseeable circumstances'.[23]

When the Treaty of Rapallo was announced to the assembled international gathering and to the world at large, it was a bombshell; it was a sensation which amazed the other participants and almost wrecked the conference.[24] The actual content of the agreement, however, was rather modest and could be regarded as merely representing a belated peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany.[25] Both countries abandoned any claims against each other for war damage. Moreover, Germany renounced its claims to all German property that had been nationalized by the Bolshevik government. Russia, on the other hand, would not make use of Article 116 of the Versailles peace treaty which provided for Russian claims for reparations from Germany, albeit in somewhat vague terms. The two countries also entered into full diplomatic relations and agreed to conduct their economic affairs on a most-

20. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', pp. 123–4, 142–3. The quote is from Krüger, 'Rainy Day', p. 59.

21. See Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', p. 143; Krüger, 'Rainy Day', p. 57.

22. See Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', pp. 123–4, 128ff.; see also note 10 above.

23. Krüger, 'Rainy Day', p. 60.

24. See Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', p. 138; Lee and Michalka, *German Foreign Policy*, p. 56.

25. See Schieder, 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 593, 599–600.

favoured-nation basis.[26] Despite immediate rumours that Russia and Germany had also signed secret military agreements and entered into extensive commercial deals, this was not the case, though subsequently a close and secret military and trade relationship between the two countries began to flourish.[27]

The significance of the Treaty of Rapallo was and still is highly controversial. For the Soviet Union it was for decades the model of how to enter into agreements with capitalist states based on 'peaceful co-existence'. For many Germans it was the first attempt to revise the detested Versailles peace treaty which had demoted Germany, as it was viewed, from its rightful great-power status. This is not the place, however, to enter into a detailed discussion of the relevant literature.[28] It is sufficient to state that Hermann Graml's controversial thesis that the Treaty of Rapallo was meant to destroy the 'policy of fulfilment' and represented in fact 'a German–Soviet "revisionist" conspiracy' directed against the Treaty of Versailles has not entirely stood the test of time.[29] At least partially, Rapallo seems to have been a 'treaty of normalization and liquidation, born of immediate economic and political needs',[30] though whether it was politically in the best interest of the German people to sign the treaty at this point is questionable. It seems, however, to be somewhat of an exaggeration to regard the Treaty of Rapallo as 'one of the major mistakes of German politics which turned the history of Europe into a fateful direction'.[31]

Rapallo was not simply defensive. It was also a preventive treaty. With its dramatic action the Berlin government was pointing out to the Western world that relations with Soviet Russia were predominantly a German matter and that 'the Allies should neither negotiate nor come

26. See Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, p. 43; Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Die Weimarer Republik*, Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte Vol. 19 (Munich, 1980), pp. 154–5.

27. See Lee and Michalka, *German Foreign Policy*, p. 56; Schieder, 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 550–4; Helmut Heiber, *Die Republik von Weimar* 12th edn (Munich, 1979), p. 108; B. Whaley, *Covert German Rearmament, 1919–1939: Deception and Misperception* (Frederick, 1984), pp. 77–86; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, 'Grossindustrie und Rapallopolitik: Deutsch-sowjetische Handelsbeziehungen in der Weimarer Republik', *Historische Zeitschrift* 222 (1976), 265–341.

28. For a discussion of the literature see the excellent survey in Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, pp. 172–4.

29. See ibid., p. 173; Hermann Graml, *Europa zwischen den Kriegen* 5th edn (Munich, 1982); idem, 'Die Rapallo-Politik im Urteil der westdeutschen Forschung', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 18 (1970), 366–91.

30. See Schieder, 'Entstehungsgeschichte', 549, 551ff., 587ff., 599ff. (English quote from Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, p. 173). See also Michael Laffan, 'Weimar and Versailles: German Foreign Policy, 1919–33', in idem, *The Burden of German History, 1919–45* (London, 1988), p. 89.

31. Müller, 'Rapallo–Karriere eines Reizwortes', p. 60.

to any arrangement with Russia over Germany's head'.[32] The treaty represented Germany's first bid for equality and great-power status since Versailles. This does not mean that it was the beginning of a crudely revisionist anti-Western policy, though it certainly had an adverse effect on the slowly emerging European consciousness and on any plans for European cooperation developed by Lloyd George and others.[33] The 'Rapallo legend' of a conspiratorial Soviet–German deal against the Western world must largely be regarded as a myth, albeit a very influential one. Even today, this legend has proven to be almost indestructible.[34] Still, to a considerable degree the Germans had only themselves to blame for the creation of such a myth. After all, Rapallo was indeed 'a risky gamble that Germany might substantially improve its international position by establishing a special, intimate relationship with Soviet Russia, thereby [at least potentially] continuously threatening other European powers with a close Russo-German tie on all levels and thus demonstrating for domestic as well as international purposes a strong sense of national independence'.[35] Since then, 'Rapallo has been without doubt, in the eyes of the West, a reminder of the possibility of further, separate and perhaps more threatening agreements between Germany and Russia'.[36]

ADENAUER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN 1955

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, however, the Western Allies had no reason to fear that the West German government would be tempted to do a deal with the Soviet Union in an attempt to unify the divided country. It was well known in Western capitals that Chancellor Adenauer strongly believed in the need for integrating the Federal Republic with the West. He was also a convinced advocate of

32. See Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', pp. 123–4.

33. See Krüger, 'Rainy Day', pp. 63–4; also idem, 'European Ideology and European Reality: European Unity and German Foreign Policy in the 1920s', in Peter M. Stirk, ed., *European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period* (London, 1989), pp. 89–91.

34. See Kolb, *Weimar Republic*, p. 174. It has been rightly said that the real importance of the Treaty of Rapallo lies in the exaggerated significance it has been given generally. See Bernd Martin, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang? Deutsche Grossmachtpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1989), p. 83.

35. Krüger, 'Rainy Day', p. 56.

36. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Preventive Diplomacy', p. 123.

a united Europe,[37] and his support led to some notable successes on this path. Above all, France, West Germany and the Benelux countries signed up to the Schumann Plan in 1950, which later resulted in the union of the coal and steel industries.[38] The signing of the Bonn and Paris treaties in May 1952 established the formation of a European Defence Community (EDC) which was meant to provide for peaceful West German rearmament and protection against an invasion from the East. The pursuit of an ever closer political union was also mentioned in this context. The Bonn and Paris treaties guaranteed almost full sovereignty for the West German state once the treaties had been ratified by the national parliaments of the six signatory states.[39]

Without doubt, Adenauer's primary political goals were to obtain full national sovereignty for West Germany and the country's integration with the West as an equal. The Chancellor had little faith in his fellow countrymen and was determined to make it impossible for either the Germans or their future leaders to conduct independent power-politics and thus to embark again upon the path to war or to seek a too-close rapprochement with the USSR.[40] He never admitted this in public. This was for both practical political, as well as for personal, philosophical, reasons. The Chancellor was realistic enough to regard German unification as something which only ought to be achieved in the long run – if at all.[41]

37. See, for example, Werner Weidenfeld, *Konrad Adenauer und Europa: Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers* (Bonn, 1976); Ludolf Herbst *et al.*, eds, *Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt* (Munich, 1990). On Adenauer see above all Henning Köhler, *Adenauer: Eine Politische Biographie* (Frankfurt, 1994); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–67* (Stuttgart, 1991); and, of course, Adenauer's extensive memoirs: *Erinnerungen* Vols 1 and 2, 4th edn (Stuttgart, 1984).

38. See John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge, 1991).

39. See Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950–1955* (Cambridge, 1991); Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II* (London, 1971); Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London, 1980).

40. See Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO): FO 371/118 254/WG 1071/1374, 15/12/1955, conversation between the British Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick and the German Ambassador in London, Herwarth von Bittenfeld; also PRO: FO 371/118 183/WG 10338/153, letter Allen (Bonn) to Johnston (Foreign Office, London – hereafter FO), 17/9/1955. See also Peter Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag* 2nd edn (Munich, 1989), p. 41.

41. See Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die deutsche Frage, 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 1995), pp. 147ff.; see also the various articles in Josef Foschepoth, ed., *Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage* 2nd edn (Göttingen, 1990).

Due to the French parliament's hesitation in giving up sovereignty over a large part of its military forces, the ratification of the EDC treaty failed in August 1954. However, an alternative route to West German rearmament and integration with the West was found in the autumn. It enabled the Federal Republic to join both the Western European Union and NATO on 5 May 1955 and thereby obtain its sovereignty.[42] Only two weeks later, on 20 May, the Warsaw Pact was founded with the GDR as an integral member. German unification had become even more unlikely to happen than before. While the Federal Republic's integration with the West had now been realized, no genuine rapprochement with Moscow had taken place. Consequently, in the early Cold War years the 'Rapallo factor' did not play a decisive role in West Germany's relations with the wider world. In actual fact, it was generally feared that the Bonn government's accession to NATO might worsen East–West relations further.[43]

This, however, was not the case. Instead, 1955 proved to be a watershed as far as Moscow's policies regarding both the East–West conflict and the German question were concerned. In all likelihood, until the uprising in the GDR in June 1953 the Soviet Union had hoped to be able to prevent the integration of the Federal Republic with the West and thereby to obtain German unification on a neutral basis.[44] When this failed to happen, the USSR gradually began to adopt a strategy which required that Germany should remain permanently divided. Consequently, Moscow needed international recognition of its protegé, the GDR. It also meant that the improvement of relations with the West, particularly with West Germany, would be prudent. After all, apart from the desire to obtain acceptance of the East Berlin government,

42. See Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner, eds, *France Defeats the EDC* (New York, 1957); Paul Noack, *Das Scheitern der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Entstehungsprozesse vor und nach dem 30. August 1954* (Düsseldorf, 1977); Rolf Steininger, 'Das Scheitern der EVG und der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik zur NATO', *APUZ* 17 (27/4/1985), 3–18; Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 820ff.

43. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, Vol. 2: 1953–1955*, p. 448.

44. See Klaus Larres, 'Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States and the East German Uprising of 1953', *Twentieth Century British History* 5.3 (1994), 320–50; see also Christian Ostermann, *The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback* (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 1994). On Moscow's German policy since mid-1953 see Boris Meissner, 'Die deutsch–sowjetischen Beziehungen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', *Osteuropa* (1985), pp. 631–52; Eberhard Schulz, 'Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik', in Dietrich Geyer, ed., *Osteuropa-Handbuch. Sowjetunion: Aussenpolitik: 1955–73* (Cologne, 1976), pp. 229–93.

the new Soviet leadership also wished to improve its poor trade relations with the West.[45]

From February 1955 this became an active policy, once Prime Minister Malenkov had been replaced by Bulganin with Khrushchev being the mover behind the scenes. The USSR embarked on a policy of *détente* and peaceful co-existence.[46] As early as 26 March, Bulganin declared that Moscow was quite ready to attend a four-power summit conference to improve international confidence. On 13 June it was announced that such a four-power conference of heads of government would take place in Geneva in the second half of July. By this stage, a particularly impressive demonstration of Soviet interest in the relaxation of the East–West conflict had already occurred. It was the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on 15 May. Austria remained undivided, received its sovereignty on the condition of 'perpetual neutrality' and the Soviet occupation forces left the country.[47] Khrushchev and Bulganin also embarked upon a dramatic rapprochement with Tito by visiting Belgrade between 26 May and 2 June.[48] Then, on 7 June 1955 Adenauer received an invitation to visit Moscow 'in the near future' to 'consider the question of establishing diplomatic and trade relations . . . and to examine the relevant issues'. It was stated that 'no preliminary conditions' for entering into diplomatic relations were deemed necessary. The Soviet Union hoped that 'personal contact' with Adenauer and any of his representa-

45. See Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German–Soviet Relations, 1955–1980* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 27–35. See also Gerhard Wettig, 'Die beginnende Umorientierung der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr und Sommer 1953', *Deutschland-Archiv* 28.5 (1995), 495–507.

46. In the course of Adenauer's negotiations in Moscow Khrushchev still maintained that NATO was a hostile alliance and the 'Soviet Union was doing everything it could to weaken NATO'. However, the Soviet Union had realized that asking for the dissolution of NATO was 'unrealistic' – the 'important thing was co-existence'. *Foreign Relations of the United State* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 576: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 11/9/1955.

47. It was also agreed that for the purpose of securing neutrality 'in all future times Austria will not join any military alliances and will not permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory'. Royal Institute of International Affairs (hereafter RIIA), ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1955* (London, 1958), p. 239. See also Günter Bischof, 'Österreichische Neutralität, die deutsche Frage und europäische Sicherheit 1953–1955', in Rolf Steininger *et al.*, eds, *Die doppelte Eindämmung: Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern* (Munich, 1993), pp. 133–76; Rolf Steininger, '1955: The Austrian State Treaty and the German Question', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 3.3 (1992), 494–522.

48. See Stephen Clissold, ed., *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939–1973: A Documentary Survey* (London, 1975); Pierre Maurer, *La reconciliation sovieto-yougoslave, 1954–1958: illusions et desillusions de Tito* (Fribourg, CH, 1991).

tives could be established in the 'interest of peace and European security'.[49]

In the West, the note from Moscow was regarded as 'a diplomatic sensation of the first order'.[50] The general 'vigour and freshness and apparent conciliatoriness of the new Soviet regime . . . gave western statesmen much to think about'.[51] Adenauer, in particular, was confronted with a political dilemma. The new climate of *détente* and the invitation to visit Moscow exposed the inner contradictions in the Chancellor's politics. As early as 1952 Adenauer had hinted that the possibility of entering into closer relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were part and parcel of West German sovereignty.[52] But it was obvious that such a policy would raise the difficult question of recognizing the GDR, a country which was already represented by an ambassador in the Soviet capital but was regarded as illegitimate by both Bonn and the West. The situation was similar in respect to the Polish border along the Oder–Neisse line which the Adenauer government

49. The note is published in RIIA, ed., *Documents*, pp. 245–8, with quotes on pp. 248, 245. See also *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 544: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 6/8/1955. Regarding Adenauer's invitation and subsequent journey to Moscow see above all Josef Foschepoth, 'Adenauers Moskaureise 1955', *APUZ* 22 (31/5/1986), 30–46; Detlef Felken, *Dulles und Deutschland: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1953–1959* (Bonn, 1993), pp. 320–6; Köhler, *Adenauer*, pp. 872–89; Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann*, pp. 189–222; idem, *Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre der Republik 1949–1957* (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 273–82; Max Schulze-Vorberg, 'Die Moskaureise 1955', in Dieter Blumenwitz *et al.*, eds, *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers* (Stuttgart, 1976), I, pp. 651–64; Rainer Salzmann, 'Adenauers Moskaureise in sowjetischer Sicht', in Blumenwitz *et al.*, *Adenauer und seine Zeit*, (Stuttgart, 1976), II, pp. 131–59. See also the memoirs from members of Adenauer's delegation, above all Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Rückblenden, 1976–1951* (Berlin, 1979), pp. 229–51; Herbert Blankenhorn, *Verständnis und Verständigung: Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs 1949 bis 1979* (Frankfurt, 1980), pp. 224–35; Carlo Schmidt, *Erinnerungen* (Bern, 1979), pp. 564–85; and, of course, Adenauer himself, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, pp. 487–556. See also Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (London, 1974), pp. 357–62.

50. *Christian Science Monitor*, 8/6/1955, quoted in RIIA, ed., *Survey of International Affairs, 1955–56* (London, 1960), p. 138.

51. RIIA, ed., *Survey*, p. 69.

52. On Adenauer's *Ostpolitik* see Peter Siebenmorgen, *Gezeitenwechsel: Aufbruch zur Entspannungspolitik* (Bonn, 1990); Christoph Klessmann, 'Adenauers Deutschland- und Ostpolitik 1955–1963', in Foschepoth, ed., *Adenauer*, pp. 61–79; Gottfried Niedhart and Normen Altmann, 'Zwischen Beurteilung und Verurteilung: Die Sowjetunion im Urteil Konrad Adenauers', in ibid., pp. 99–117; Boris Meissner, 'Adenauer und die Sowjetunion von 1955 bis 1959', in Blumenwitz *et al.*, eds, *Adenauer* II, pp. 192ff.; Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Adenauers Ostpolitik', in Wolfram Hanrieder *et al.*, eds, *Im Spannungsfeld der Weltpolitik: 30 Jahre deutsche Aussenpolitik* (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 207–32; Klaus Gotto, 'Adenauers Deutschland- und Ostpolitik 1954–1963', in Klaus Gotto *et al.*, eds, *Konrad Adenauer: Seine Deutschland- und Aussenpolitik 1945–1963* (Munich, 1975), pp. 156–286.

refused to accept as permanent. Bonn continued to insist on observing that part of the 1945 Potsdam agreement which said that Germany's eastern border was to be decided by a future German peace treaty.[53]

Adenauer had always emphasized that German unification would only come about in a climate of East–West *détente* and disarmament. This, he strongly believed, could only be achieved by a Western policy of strength.[54] Now *détente*, in the form of a personal invitation to Moscow, had arrived. Nevertheless, the Chancellor had no intention of changing his policy. He was deeply distrustful of the Soviet peace initiative.[55] Adenauer was convinced that the Soviet Union was 'now weak and . . . [the West] should not grant them the time to recover'.[56] However, he found himself under increasing pressure to develop a more flexible attitude. German public opinion and the SPD opposition believed very strongly that the Chancellor ought to travel to Moscow as soon as possible.[57] Also the pressure from German business – mostly loyal supporters of the government – to develop much more extensive trade relations with the East was an important factor which Adenauer could not afford to ignore.[58] The next general elections were due in two years' time. To an ever increasing number of people, only normal relations with Moscow would provide a way out of the 'dead end of the cold

53. See Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann*, pp. 177–9.

54. On the West's 'policy of strength' see the standard work by Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power* (London, 1962). Regarding Adenauer's anti-communism see, for example, Weidenfeld, *Adenauer und Europa*, pp. 142–79. For the relationship between Dulles and Adenauer see Felken, *Dulles*, pp. 145–50; Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, 'Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles and West German–American Relations', in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ, 1990), pp. 109–32; Manfred Görtemaker, 'John Foster Dulles und die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Steininger *et al.*, eds, *Eindämmung*, pp. 9–38.

55. In his memoirs Adenauer says: 'It was my conviction that the Soviet Union aimed at a period of détente in order to solve the [inner] problems the Soviet leadership found itself confronted with. Yet, there was no indication that the USSR had changed its inner goal, which was the ambition to conquer and rule the world through communism'. *Erinnerungen*, Vol. 2, p. 491.

56. *FRUS* 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 226: Conversation Adenauer–Dulles, 13/6/1955.

57. See Salzmann, 'Adenauers Moskaureise', p. 137.

58. See RIIA, ed., *Survey*, p. 140; Stent, *Embargo*, pp. 35–40. In this field, as in others, Adenauer had to be careful not to arouse too much suspicion. For example, Douglas Dodds-Parker, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs, expressed in mid-September 1955 the widely shared opinion: 'Chancellor Adenauer, of course, is definitely pro-West, but Germany has traditional economic ties to Russia in the East. It is the old struggle between the Teutons and the Slavs. Only the fact that neither will allow the other to rule the household prevents a grand alliance against the West'. PRO: FO 371/118 183/WG 10338/161, 13/9/1955. See also Hanna Paul Calm, *Ostpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen in der Ära Adenauer* (Frankfurt, 1981).

war'.[59] Most importantly, it was obvious that German unification could only be obtained through discussions with the Soviet Union. Now the Federal government had received the opportunity of talking to Moscow directly for the first time since the war; due to West Germany's newly found sovereignty one did not have to rely on the mediation of the Western Allies any more. Adenauer, therefore, was in no position to decline the invitation. There was also the highly emotive question of the fate of a considerable number of German soldiers and civilian internees who were still captive in the Soviet Union.[60] By early 1955 Moscow was ready to use these captives to make the Bonn government more amenable to Soviet wishes. The Kremlin's strategy was to claim that a solution to the problem could easily be found once Adenauer had entered into negotiations on the issue.[61] Thus, the German public hoped that Adenauer's journey to Moscow would lead to considerable progress in the matter.

There existed, however, yet another potentially difficult issue which the Chancellor had to tackle. This was the relationship with the Western Allies and the suspicion that Adenauer's invitation to Moscow and any arrangements agreed upon with the Soviet government could easily lead to the beginning of a new 'Rapallo policy'.[62] Indeed, the French government's initial reaction to the invitation from the Kremlin was described by British diplomats as 'one of some apprehension'.[63] Adenauer, therefore, had to avoid creating the impression that the German government was about to do yet another secret deal with the Soviet Union. In his memoirs the Chancellor describes his difficult task as follows: 'The prime task of my negotiations in Moscow had to be: absolute loyalty to the West. We could not afford to give rise to the slightest suspicion regarding our firm attachment to the West.'[64] Moreover, because of the general enthusiasm for the Austrian State Treaty,

59. *Rheinische Post* as quoted (without date) in RIIA, ed., *Survey*, p. 140.

60. See Foschepoth, 'Adenauer's Moskaureise', 31–4. See also Dieter Riesenberger, ed., *Das Deutsche Rote Kreuz, Konrad Adenauer und das Kriegsgefangenenproblem: Die Rückführung der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen aus der Sowjetunion (1952–1955)* (Bremen, 1994); and Arthur L. Smith, *Die 'vermisste Million': Zum Schicksal deutscher Kriegsgefangener nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1992).

61. Regarding the German POWs in the Soviet Union see also PRO: FO 371/118 404 (July–December 1955). See also for the GDR: Beate Ihme-Tuchel, 'Die SED und die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion zwischen 1949 und 1955', in *Deutschland-Archiv* 27.5 (1994), 490–503.

62. For the US view in connection with Adenauer's visit to Moscow see *FRUS* 1955–57, Vol. 5, pp. 224–38, 566–601. For the British view see PRO: FO 371/118 178–183 (March–October 1955).

63. PRO: FO 371/118 178/WG 10338/19, Minute Hancock, 8/6/1955.

64. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, pp. 493, 449.

Adenauer believed he needed to convince the Allied powers that a similar solution to the German question, namely the creation of a unified but neutral Germany or a belt of neutral states or zones in the middle of Europe, was much too dangerous.[65]

With hindsight, however, it is most unlikely that Moscow was seriously willing to sacrifice the GDR in favour of a solution to the German question modelled on the Austrian State Treaty. In fact, the note to Adenauer indicated that Moscow's aim was to stabilize the *status quo* in Europe. The Soviet Union wished to have 'normal' relations not only with East Berlin but also with Bonn. In all likelihood it was European *détente* and the realization of the 'two-state theory' that were the main reasons for Moscow's approach to Adenauer and not German unification.[66] 'For the next 15 years, the main goal of the USSR's policy vis-à-vis West Germany remained constant: to obtain Bonn's acceptance of both the postwar borders and the permanent division of Germany.'[67] At the time, however, it was hardly surprising that different conclusions were drawn. Adenauer particularly believed very strongly that it was Moscow's intention to woo West Germany and to ascertain whether or not Bonn could be tempted to embark on a 'Rapallo policy'.[68]

Adenauer was therefore careful to consult the Western Allies, above all the USA, about the invitation to Moscow, which had not come entirely as a surprise to them, though it had not been expected that Moscow would react so quickly after the Federal Republic's accession to NATO.[69] On the whole, the American administration believed that the Kremlin did not seriously anticipate reaching an agreement with Adenauer but wanted to manoeuvre him into a position in which he

65. Ibid., pp. 441–6, 449. See also *FRUS* 1955–57, Vol. 5, pp. 225–6: Conversation Adenauer–Dulles, 13/6/1955.

66. See, for example, Foschepoth, 'Adenauers Moskaureise', 34–5; Wettig, 'Die beginnende Umorientierung', 504–7. For a view to the contrary see Salzmann, 'Adenauers Moskaureise', pp. 136–41; Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 294. See also Harold Macmillan's view as expressed in a conversation with Dulles in Paris on 15 July 1955: *FRUS* 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 320.

67. F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Moscow and the German Question', in Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe, eds, *The Germans and their Neighbours* (Boulder, Colo., 1993), p. 206.

68. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, p. 553; see also Salzmann, 'Adenauers Moskaureise', pp. 135–6.

69. See *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 544, note 3; PRO: FO 371/118 178/WG 10338/G, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 555, 8/6/1955. Even before the official invitation, the East had attempted to establish personal contact with the Adenauer government. For example, Finance Minister Schäffer was asked to travel to East Berlin to meet up with an old acquaintance of his, Vinzenz Müller, who was now the supreme commandant of the East German police. Adenauer made sure that the Allied powers were fully informed about this development, which did not lead to any results. See in detail Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann*, pp. 191–3; Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, p. 450.

would be forced to turn down a Soviet offer of unification and thus become very unpopular at home. The SPD opposition, which regarded a neutral and united Germany as acceptable, would undoubtedly be strengthened by such an event. This coincided with Adenauer's own view.[70] After all, internal politics obliged Adenauer to 'make a determined effort to ensure that the question of German reunification was at least discussed in Moscow'.[71] There remained, however, an element of insecurity. The Soviet Union was always good for a surprise and might well present some genuine proposals to Adenauer. Therefore, the Chancellor was very careful to keep in close touch with the Western Allies.

During the course of a visit to the USA in mid-June, the Chancellor informed President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles personally. He pointed out that he did not want to travel to Moscow before the four-power heads of government meeting in Geneva that July. This was so that the Western position on German unification could be made clear before the meeting with the Soviet leadership. He also felt that it might be a good idea if any subsequent four-power foreign ministers' meeting could be held after his return from Moscow. The Western Allies would then be able to benefit from his trip. He emphasized that no concessions should be made 'without obtaining German unification in return'.[72] Adenauer also used the opportunity to warn against any ideas of establishing a neutral Germany or neutral zones in Europe.[73] This in particular was the topic of his conversation with British Prime Minister Eden, whom he visited on his way back from the USA.[74]

In August, following the conference which had produced the much-acclaimed 'spirit of Geneva'[75] and a month before Adenauer's visit, the

70. See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, Vol. 2, p. 450; PRO: FO 371/118 183/WG 10338/156, letter Beith (Paris) to Johnston (FO), 22/9/1955.

71. PRO: FO 371/118 179/WG 10338/42, Minute Caccia about his conversation with German Ambassador von Herwarth, 15/8/1955.

72. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, p. 460.

73. Ibid., pp. 441–6, 455–65. On Adenauer's US visit see also PRO: FO 371/118 151, Hoyer Millar (Bonn) to FO, Nos 301 and 309, 16/6 and 23/6/1955.

74. Eden mentioned in passing that the West had to consider the possibility that Moscow might have lost interest in a united Germany. See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, pp. 462–5; see also PRO: PREM 11/905, FO to UK Delegation in San Francisco, No. 13 (PM T (E) 55/55), 21/6/1955.

75. For the Geneva summit conference see Hermann-Josef Rupieper, 'Gipfeldiplomatie 1955: Dwight D. Eisenhower und Georgij Schukow über Europäische Sicherheit und Deutsche Frage', in Rolf Steininger *et al.*, eds, *Eindämmung*, pp. 213–32; Mechthild Lindemann, 'Die Deutschlandfrage auf der Gipfelkonferenz und der Aussenministerkonferenz in Genf 1955', in Dieter Blumenwitz, Karl Wilhelm Fricke *et al.*, eds, *Die Deutschlandfrage vom 17. Juni 1953 bis zu den Genfer Viermächtekonferenzen von 1955* (Berlin, 1990), pp. 177–205.

German ambassador to Washington, Heinz Krekeler, was in constant touch with the American administration. On 10 August the Chancellor expressed his thoughts in a personal letter to Dulles from which the Secretary of State concluded 'that Adenauer obviously felt nervous about his forthcoming Moscow trip'.[76] At the end of the month, Adenauer's close confidant, Herbert Blankenhorn, was dispatched to Paris and London to inform the respective governments there of the Chancellor's thinking.[77] On 31 August, Dulles' trusted adviser, Livingston Merchant, came to Bonn for 'private and informal talks'.[78] Adenauer explained his quite detailed strategy for the negotiations in Moscow. He once again said that he was merely embarking on an 'exploratory' journey and only intended to get to know the Soviet leadership.[79] Without progress over the questions of German unification and the prisoners of war, no diplomatic relations would be entered into.[80] In the event of progress being made, however, which he regarded as most unlikely,[81] Adenauer was still only prepared to exchange 'diplomatic agents' with Moscow and to have political commissions set up to look into issues such as unification, the POWs and diplomatic recognition. As far as economic issues were concerned, 'there was little in the Soviet trade that Germany needed'. Adenauer summarized his strategy by saying, 'There could be no true normalization as represented by full diplomatic relations so long as the Soviet Union maintained the GDR regime.'[82]

Adenauer emphasized that he had 'little hope of success'[83] and that he was quite prepared, if the Russians were intransigent on the return of the POWs, reunification and other issues, 'to break off negotiations and return to Bonn'. Merchant agreed with this strategy. The Chancellor's adviser, Blankenhorn, added 'that it was not the German intention

76. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 546: Conversation Eisenhower–Dulles, 11/8/1955; see also Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, pp. 478–80.

77. PRO: FO 371/118 180/WG 10338/61, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 475, 25/8/1955.

78. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 550: Letter Dulles to Adenauer, 15/8/1955.

79. See PRO: FO 371/118 180/WG 10338/87, FO to British Embassy Bonn, No. 712, 2/9/1955; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, pp. 567, 569: Conversation Adenauer–Merchant *et al.*, 31/8/1955.

80. See *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 574: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 10/9/1955; PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/94, Minute Kirkpatrick, 8/9/1955.

81. See PRO: FO 371/118 180/10338/80, FO to Bonn, No. 712, on Kirkpatrick's conversation with Blankenhorn in London, 2/9/1955.

82. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, pp. 567–9: Conversation Adenauer–Merchant *et al.*, 31/8/1955.

83. According to the British record, Adenauer said: 'He expected very little, not even agreement on the return of the prisoners of war.' PRO: FO 371/118 180/WG 10338/87, FO to Bonn, No. 712, 2/9/1955.

to reach final decisions'. The realization of a 'middle solution between the two extremes of breaking off negotiations and establishing full relations' might be the best 'means of continuing contact with the Russians'.[84] The British Foreign Office's Permanent Under-Secretary, Ivone Kirkpatrick, also agreed with this strategy. He 'thought it a good thing for the Germans to hold up on the establishment of full diplomatic relations'.[85]

All in all, the Chancellor was careful to give the Western Allies as much information and reassurance as possible prior to his departure for Moscow. Upon arriving on 8 September, Adenauer reported to Dulles 'that nothing has happened to disturb Germany–US relationship'.[86] Soon, however, it became clear that the Chancellor had overestimated his ability to direct the negotiations. He confessed that he 'had taken too stiff a line immediately before . . . [his] visit to Moscow'. In the next few days Adenauer would have to go 'a good deal further down the throat of the Russian bear than he had said he was going to do before leaving Bonn'.[87]

On the whole, the American and British administrations believed in Adenauer's loyalty to the West. The 'Rapallo factor' and the fear of a separate Russo-German special relationship did little to influence Western policy-makers in their view. The only exception was Washington's ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen. Although initially 'confident' that Adenauer would 'not accept' full diplomatic relations, Bohlen had been in favour of postponing the visit.[88] He found it 'difficult to see what advantage there would be . . . by [Adenauer's] personal visit prior to establishing diplomatic relations'.[89] Adenauer's activities in Moscow only confirmed his view. To him, these were equivalent to the 'appeasement' of the Soviet Union.[90] When, late on

84. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 569. Similar statements were made during German State Secretary Hallstein's and Foreign Minister von Brentano's conversations with British officials in Bonn. See, for example, PRO: FO 371/118 180/WG 10338/61, Allen (Bonn) to FO, Nos 475 and 480, 27/8/1955 and 28/8/1955.

85. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 571: Conversation Kirkpatrick–Merchant *et al.* in London, 1/9/1955.

86. Quoted in Felken, *Dulles*, p. 321.

87. PRO: FO 371/118 183/WG 10338/156, letter Beith (Paris) to Johnston (FO), 22/9/1955; ibid., WG 10338/158, Minute Ward, 15/9/1955; ibid., 118 182/WG 10338/142, Jebb (Paris) to FO, No. 371, 21/9/1955.

88. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 575: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 10/9/1955.

89. Ibid., p. 545: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 6/8/1955. See also PRO: FO 371/118 180/WG 10338/88, Minute Jellicoe on Bohlen's views, 8/9/1955.

90. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York, 1973), p. 387; Grewe, *Rückblenden*, pp. 245–51; PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/94, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1025, 13/9/1955.

12 September, Blankenhorn informed him, together with the British and French ambassadors, about a deal on opening diplomatic relations, proposed at the very last minute by the Soviets, Bohlen exploded. The French ambassador also 'became rather excited'.[91]

At a reception for the German delegation in the evening of 12 September, Bulganin and Khrushchev had suddenly suggested entering into a secret 'gentlemen's agreement',[92] involving the 'release of all German nationals at present detained or imprisoned in Soviet Union in return for diplomatic relations with Federal Republic and exchange of ambassadors'. This was 'a complete surprise' to Adenauer, coming as it did after the day's totally 'negative and occasionally acrid discussion'. Blankenhorn expressed the view that despite the dissent of some of the Chancellor's advisers, Adenauer would not be able to refuse the return of the prisoners. Bohlen, however, pointed out to him that the USSR was, in fact, offering the 'prisoners against legalization of the division of Germany' and 'doubted whether any letter of reservation in regard to GDR would change that basic fact'.[93] Bohlen even went so far 'as to say that the next step would be for the Chancellor to agree to Germany leaving NATO in exchange for reunification'.[94]

The British government was less adamant. Although William Hayter, the British ambassador, was much more critical of Adenauer's conduct than his colleagues in London, he did not go as far as Bohlen. Despite some misgivings, in general London viewed with 'equanimity' the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Moscow. After all, the British had never been very keen on German unification. On the whole they believed that the continued division of Germany would ensure that Europe would be much more stable and peaceful.[95] Furthermore, the government in London had 'little

91. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/94, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1025, 13/9/1955. See also Bohlen, *Witness to History*; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, pp. 579–84.

92. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 582: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 14/9/1955; PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/94, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1025, 13/9/1955. Regarding Moscow's wish to keep the 'bargain' secret see PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10339/109, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 513, 14/9/1955.

93. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10339/109, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 513, 14/9/1955; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 580: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 13/9/1955. See also Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 359–60.

94. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10339/109, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 513, 14/9/1955.

95. See, for example, the successful attempts by the FO in 1953–55 to 'scupper' Churchill's endeavours to overcome the division of Germany by means of an international summit conference in Larres, *Politik der Illusionen*, pp. 151ff.; see ibid., p. 181, for Minister

doubt that the Chancellor will accept the Russian offer whatever we say'.[96]

However, Adenauer's retreat in Moscow could hardly be overlooked. Despite his strong assurances beforehand – 'firmness was the only thing they understood'[97] – a rapprochement with the 'arch enemy' had actually taken place. The British even spoke of a 'very considerable victory for the Russians'.[98] In return, Adenauer had merely received a verbal promise that Moscow would release all of the remaining 9,626 German 'war criminals' as well as any surviving civilian internees either to East or West Germany depending on where they used to live. During the negotiations, the issue of German unification, which Dulles, particularly, had wished to be at the centre of the discussions, was hardly mentioned. Instead, the Soviet Union adopted a very tough and intransigent stand and advised Adenauer 'to establish contact with [the] GDR' if he wished to bring about German unification.[99] In the end, the German view that, despite entering into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic was still the sole legitimate representative of the whole of Germany was merely communicated as a unilateral statement to Bulganin in the form of a letter. It was also pointed out that Bonn recognized neither the legitimacy of the GDR nor the Oder–Neisse line as Germany's eastern border.[100]

Ambassador Bohlen was convinced that Adenauer's negotiations in Moscow had been 'disastrous'. He believed that the permanent division of Germany and the existence of the GDR were gaining acceptance through the back door – something Bonn had always claimed it would never be prepared to tolerate. Bohlen also 'was exceedingly angry' about the fact that Adenauer had promised the Soviets to have a word with the

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of State Selwyn Lloyd's famous statement regarding the necessity of the continued division of Germany.

96. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/94, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1025, 13/9/1955.

97. On 11 September he had also told the Western ambassadors in Moscow somewhat prematurely that 'his chief conclusion from the visit was that it was useless to try to deal with these people by amiability'. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/93, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1025, 11/9/1955.

98. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/109, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1039, 14/9/1955.

99. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 575: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 11/9/1955; PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/91, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, Nos 1018 and 1019, 10/9/1955, No. 1020, 11/9/1955, on his conversations with Blankenhorn.

100. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, pp. 547–51. See also PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/107, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1037, 14/9/1955. On the legal implications of the establishment of diplomatic relations see WG 10338/143, Memorandum Fitzmaurice, the Legal Adviser, 15/9/1955.

Americans about balloons which carried US propaganda material into the Soviet Union.[101] The ambassador reported to the State Department a 'complete collapse of the West German position' and spoke of Moscow's 'greatest diplomatic victory in [the] post-war period'. He even claimed that the countries might have entered into a 'more substantial' agreement.[102]

With this statement, the ambassador resurrected the 'Rapallo complex' as a factor in West German–American relations. Indeed, the American administration could not overlook the fact that Adenauer's proposed strategy for the negotiations in Moscow had been discarded entirely; the Chancellor had not been able to stand up to the very skilful Soviet tactics. He had been incapable of foreseeing Moscow's strategy. Adenauer was actually quite 'shocked by [the] toughness' and occasional 'rudeness' of the Russian conduct of the negotiations.[103] This had led him to tell the Western representatives, after the first few days of negotiating, that 'the positions on prisoners and unification were so far apart that there was virtually no chance for agreement'.[104] Within US governmental circles, however, it had been expected that Moscow would use the POW question to 'bribe Adenauer to break away from [the] West' and into entering diplomatic relations with the USSR.[105] At least partially, this was exactly what happened. Bohlen, in fact, thought that such a 'trade' was 'inherent' from the moment Adenauer accepted the invitation, in spite of the fact that the Chancellor had always been strongly 'against such [a] deal unless some satisfaction in regard to unity was obtained'.[106]

On the whole, the American administration received the impression that Adenauer had indeed given in to the Soviet Union. Ambassador Conant in Bonn added to this picture when he reported that Adenauer

101. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/111, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1040, 14/9/1955.

102. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 583: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 14/9/1955. When Bohlen referred to the likely consequences of this action he meant 'particularly the quasi legalization division Germany inherent in acceptance formal diplomatic relations with Soviet Union, which at the same time maintains to say least full diplomatic relations GDR'. See for this statement ibid., pp. 544–5: Bohlen to State Dept., 6/8/1955. British Ambassador Hayter was sceptical of Bohlen's conviction. See PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/109, Hayter (Moscow) to FO, No. 1039, 14/9/1955.

103. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 587: Conant (Bonn) to State Dept., 16/9/1955; PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/98, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 508, 12/9/1955.

104. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 577, note 4: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 12/9/1955. See Foschepoth, 'Adenauers Moskaureise', 41–4.

105. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 320: Beam (Paris) to State Dept., 15/7/1955, on the conversation Dulles–Macmillan in Paris.

106. Ibid., p. 580: Bohlen (Moscow) to State Dept., 13/9/1955.

and his delegation did not seem 'very happy about what had happened'.[107] Washington, however, realized that Moscow's threat to publicly announce their offer had put Adenauer in a bad position: he would have found it very difficult to explain to the West German public that he had refused the release of almost 10,000 men because he did not wish to see the establishment of a Soviet embassy in Bonn. This might easily have backfired during the 1957 elections.[108] Although West German ambassador Krekeler reported from Washington that the Eisenhower administration was not overjoyed with the results of Adenauer's journey, the USA never criticized the Chancellor openly. During as well as after the negotiations, the American administration remained loyal to Adenauer. On 12 September, when the talks in Moscow were entering a difficult phase, Dulles had asked Bohlen to tell Adenauer that his 'handling of [the] discussions inspires every confidence'. A day later, Adenauer was told that the American President 'will stand behind [the] Chancellor in whatever decision [the] Chancellor believes right'. Later Adenauer claimed that Eisenhower's message influenced him in the decision to accept Bulganin's offer.[109] Dulles may have been slightly shocked by the result of Adenauer's negotiations; but he never narrated this fact to the American public. In fact, Dulles did not trust ambassador Bohlen and had only appointed him to the post in Moscow to sideline him. Bohlen's interpretation of Adenauer's motives was therefore regarded with great caution in the State Department.[110]

On 3 October 1955, Dulles attempted to calm Adenauer's still ruffled nerves by expressing the conviction that diplomatic relations between the two countries were 'entirely natural'. He continued by saying 'that we appreciated the difficulties with which you were faced and would stand behind you in whatever decision you believed to be right. It seems to me that it would have been unintelligible to the German people if you had refused the offer with regard to the prisoners of war after the Russians had changed their position on this.'[111] The State Deparatment was 'not unduly worried' about the agreement, which 'in the circumstances' had been the 'only possible decision'. Washington was convinced

107. Ibid., p. 584: Conant (Bonn) to State Dept., 15/9/1955. For a description of the 'varying degrees of gloom' of the Chancellor's advisers see PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/109, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 513, 14/9/1955. For the view of Heinrich von Brentano, Adenauer's Foreign Minister, see Daniel Kosthorst, *Brentano und die deutsche Einheit: die Deutschland- und Ostpolitik des Aussenministers im Kabinett Adenauer 1955–61* (Melle, 1993).

108. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 585.

109. See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen* Vol. 2, p. 547. Quotes from Felken, *Dulles*, p. 324.

110. See Felken, *Dulles*, p. 324.

111. *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 5, p. 611: Letter Dulles to Adenauer, 3/10/1955.

that 'the Germans were sincerely anxious to prove themselves good allies, and . . . the recent decision would cause them to increase their efforts in this direction rather than the reverse'.[112]

The Quai d'Orsay in Paris and the British Foreign Office largely shared this view.[113] The French Foreign Ministry in particular observed that the Soviet Union had given up its aim of reunifying Germany. Instead it was noted in Paris, with satisfaction, that 'the prospect of German reunification remains as remote as ever – possibly more remote than before'.[114] Although the observation was made in London that a direct line to Moscow would make it easier for Adenauer's successors 'to revert to the old game of playing off East against West', it was acknowledged that 'the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was concluded before the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Germany'.[115] London came to the conclusion that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two was inevitable. It was pointed out with some relief that 'the visit's most dangerous potentiality . . . namely the creation of a real understanding between Moscow and Bonn behind the backs of the Western Powers' had not materialized.[116] Moreover, the British government had come to the agreeable conclusion 'that exchanging diplomatic relations is to some extent a recognition of the partition of Germany and tends, therefore, in the direction of preserving the *status quo*. But if it is the German Chancellor who himself elects to do this, surely it is not for us to be more royalist than the King?'[117] In addition, London noted with satisfaction that soon the Western powers 'should be relieved of some of the responsibilities which have allowed the Federal Government . . . to make us bear some of their Eastern burdens for them. We might also be able gradually to put our own relationship with the DDR onto a more practical basis. We cannot, however, force the pace on this nor refer to it publicly at present.'[118]

112. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/130, Scott (Washington) to FO, No. 546, 17/9/1955, on his conversation with US diplomat Kidd, head of the State Department's German Political Affairs Office.

113. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/156, letter Beith (Paris) to Johnston (FO), 22/9/1955.

114. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/142, Jebb (Paris) to FO, No. 371, 21/9/1955.

115. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/120, memorandum Johnston 'Dr. Adenauer's Visit to Moscow', 14/9/1955.

116. PRO: FO 371/118 182/WG 10338/138, letter Caccia (FO) to Hayter (Moscow), 19/9/1955.

117. PRO: FO 371/118 182/WG 10338/138, Jebb (Paris) to Kirkpatrick (FO), 15/9/1955.

118. PRO: FO 371/118 181/WG 10338/110, Allen (Bonn) to FO, No. 514, 14/9/1955.

Adenauer was held in such high esteem in Western capitals that the announcement of the Soviet–West German agreement to enter into diplomatic relations raised only a few eyebrows. There was little public criticism. The Chancellor's policy of 'Western and European integration first' and 'unification much later' had meant that the 'Rapallo factor' had not played any role whatsoever in the Western reaction to Adenauer's agreement with Moscow. With the exception of ambassador Bohlen and, to some degree, his French and British colleagues in Moscow,[119] the United States, Britain and France never believed that Adenauer was about to do a secret deal with the Soviet Union. After all, Adenauer's Moscow visit had not led to a proper Russo-German rapprochement. Instead, it seemed to have had a sobering effect on the Germans, and made them think about the implications of a deal with Moscow. The Foreign Office in London concluded with relief:

> The fact is that the German Delegation, and not least the Chancellor himself, know that they have been taken for a ride by the Russians, and they know that we know it, and they are not very happy about it, or about the future. They went off determined, so they said, not to give an inch, and not to come back with any agreement (since they saw no prospect of a good agreement). They have come back with an agreement; and the change is due to Soviet blackmail tactics and unscrupulous use of the prisoners. The upshot of it is . . . that the Germans may be wary how they come within reach of the bear's hug again.[120]

WILLY BRANDT'S *OSTPOLITIK*

A decade and a half after Adenauer's journey to Moscow, the West German government was yet again suspected of being prepared to enter into a secret deal with the Soviet Union. In October 1969 the socialist Willy Brandt was elected Chancellor, at the head of a Social Democratic–Liberal coalition government.[121] Almost immediately Brandt and

119. The fact that Bohlen was more or less alone in his sceptical view is confirmed by PRO: FO 371/118 182/WG 10338/138, Caccia, FO to Jebb (Paris), 19/9/1955.

120. PRO: FO 371/118 183/WG 10338/152, letter Allen (Bonn) to Johnston (FO), 16/9/1955.

121. See above all Arnulf Baring with Manfred Görtemaker, *Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt–Scheel* (Stuttgart, 1982); also Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany, Vol. 2: Democracy and its Discontents 1963–1988* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 151ff.

Liberal Foreign Minister Walther Scheel began to embark on their 'new Ostpolitik'.[122] They intended to turn the Federal Republic away from the outdated pursuit of a strongly anti-Eastern and pro-Western Cold War strategy towards a more balanced, more modern and also somewhat more independent and mature foreign policy.[123] After all, by the late 1960s, in Henry Kissinger's words, 'for years, the democracies had paid lip service to the idea of German unity while doing nothing to bring it about. That approach had come to the end of its possibilities. The Atlantic Alliance's German policy was collapsing.'[124]

Brandt was fortunate that his pro-Eastern *Ostpolitik* coincided with the beginning of a general period of East–West *détente*. As early as May 1964, US President Johnson had spoken of the need for 'building bridges', and in October 1966 he advanced the idea of 'peaceful engagement' with the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Even the Harmel Report, approved by the NATO member states in December 1967, spoke explicitly of the Western aim 'to further a *détente* in East–West relations'. During the Council of Ministers' meeting in Rejkjavik in June 1968 all NATO members emphasized their willingness to embark upon East–West negotiations regarding troop reductions in Europe.[125] Thus, as a German official expressed it in the early 1970s: 'The notion that it was the Germans who all of a sudden had this mad lust for dealing with the

122. A considerable amount of literature deals with *Ostpolitik*. Good overviews are given in: William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978); Bark and Gress, *Democracy and its Discontents*, pp. 90ff.; Lawrence L. Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries* (London, 1971); Stent, *Embargo*, pp. 154ff.; Peter Borowsky, *Deutschland 1970–76* 4th edn (Hanover, 1983); Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, esp. pp. 115ff.; also Manfred Uschner, *Die Ostpolitik der SPD: Sieg und Niederlage einer Strategie* (Berlin, 1991); Horst Ehmke *et al.*, eds, *Zwanzig Jahre Ostpolitik: Bilanz und Perspektiven* (Bonn, 1986); see also the somewhat confusingly structured book by Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London, 1993). See also Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 168ff. (English abridged version: *My Life in Politics*, London, 1992); Horst Ehmke, *Mittendrin: Von der Grossen Koalition zur Deutschen Einheit* (Berlin, 1994), pp. 53ff., 125ff.; Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975* (London, 1978), pp. 166ff.

123. See Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 192; Ehmke, *Mittendrin*, p. 128; Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London, 1979), p. 389.

124. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London, 1994), p. 735; see also idem, *White House Years*, pp. 409–10.

125. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, 1994), pp. 123–4, 127–8; also Adrian W. Schertz, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons* (Cologne, 1992), pp. 437ff.; Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House* (New York, 1983), p. 416; Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin, 1987), p. 187 (paperback edition); Borowsky, *Deutschland*, p. 15.

East is just historically not true.'[126] In the 1950s Adenauer had been able to use the West's policy of containment for his pro-Western strategy of integrating the Federal Republic with the West. Less than two decades later Brandt's new course also followed the general directions which had been emanating from Washington for the previous few years.

However, when Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger moved into the White House in early 1969, it was not *détente* but the war in South-east Asia which was foremost in their minds. Only after observing the successes of Brandt's policy did the Nixon administration embark on a similar course.[127] Still, by early 1970 the US government was keen on becoming involved in East–West preliminary discussions regarding the surface traffic to and from West Berlin and in a European security conference. Kissinger believed that it was necessary to embed *Ostpolitik* 'in a matrix of negotiations that enhanced the bargaining position of the Federal Republic but also set limits beyond which it could not go without an allied consensus'.[128] Washington was careful to prevent the Brandt government from acting too independently.

To discredit Brandt's initiative, a number of ill-disposed foreign observers, predominantly Americans, accused the left-wing government in Bonn of embarking upon a new 'Rapallo' policy and old-style nationalism.[129] In his memoirs, published in 1979, even Henry Kissinger drew attention to the fact that 'from Bismarck to Rapallo it was the essence of Germany's nationalist foreign policy to manoeuvre freely between East and West'.[130] Initially, his suspicions were aroused as the Bonn government seemed to be prepared to accept the division of its country 'in return for nothing more than improvements in the political atmosphere'.[131] However, this conclusion was rather unfair. After all, Kissinger, like most other politicians in both East and West, was glad

126. Quoted in Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 416. For a general overview of *détente* in the late 1960s and 1970s see Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991* (London, 1995), pp. 207ff.; Richard W. Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tension in US–Soviet Relations, 1953–1984* (Basingstoke, 1985), pp. 144ff.; also Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet–American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore, 1995).

127. See Garthoff, *Détente*, pp. 126–7; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 416.

128. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 412, see also p. 530.

129. See Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 192; Douglas Brinkley, *Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–71* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), pp. 291–2.

130. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 409, see also pp. 529–30. See also Frohn, 'Rapallo-Mythos', pp. 146–8.

131. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 824. See also Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945* (Boston, 1988), pp. 150–2.

that West Germany was finally accepting political realities; most of them had realized that *Ostpolitik* 'was more likely to lead to a permanent division of Germany than to healing its breach'.[132] Indeed, the new Chancellor was about to shatter a fundamental illusion prevalent in the Federal Republic: the belief that unification was just round the corner and that the West German state merely constituted a provisional arrangement. With this Brandt began to embark on a policy the West had secretly regarded as necessary for the last ten years, while the East had been demanding it since the mid-1950s.[133]

From the time of Adenauer's Moscow visit in 1955, all West German governments had attempted to achieve better relations with the Warsaw Pact states – without much success, however. Due to the Hallstein Doctrine, which required that the Federal government consider the recognition of the East Berlin government by another state as an unfriendly diplomatic act, and respond accordingly, West Germany had imposed severe foreign policy shackles on itself. It was high time that Bonn took a decisive step to free itself from such an obsolete and unnecessary political constraint. In the face of a loosening of Western policy towards the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic had acquired the reputation throughout the 1960s of being opposed to East–West *détente*, of being more Catholic than the Pope.[134] In the course of the Grand Coalition between 1966 and 1969, when Brandt, as Foreign Minister, had cautiously initiated his new policy, he had realized that Bonn's Western partners would leave it to the West German government to modernize its foreign policy. While they would continue to protect the Federal Republic through NATO, in political matters West Germany had to take the initiative itself.[135] The Soviet Union had been extending more positive feelers for a number of years. Western statesmen assumed that Moscow was worried about its increasingly strained relations with China and therefore wished to improve relations with its western neighbours.[136] Moreover, since the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968, the USSR had become more intent than ever to 'secure an agreement with the West that would recognize the legitimacy of Soviet

132. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 411.

133. See, for example, Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, pp. 160ff.

134. Ibid.; also Garthoff, *Détente*, p. 125.

135. Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*; Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 188; Brian White, *Britain, Détente and Changing East–West Relations* (London, 1992), p. 121.

136. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 966; Stent, *Embargo*, pp. 157–9; Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, pp. 154–5.

influence in Eastern Europe and thereby lessen the prospect of another Czechoslovakia'.[137]

Brandt knew, however, that he had to convince the world that *Ostpolitik* did not mean the abandonment of NATO and European integration. He began in December 1969, in the course of an EC summit meeting in the Hague, by persuading French President Pompidou to discontinue France's opposition to Britain's entry to the EEC. It was also Brandt who took the first step towards turning the EC from a purely economic to a more political organization. The EC member states began to co-ordinate their foreign policy in the Council of Ministers. As both Britain and France harboured fears of a resurgent German nationalism, European integration was actually spurred on by *Ostpolitik*.[138] Brandt took every opportunity to assure his Western partners within the NATO Council that the German government was deeply committed to the European Community and NATO and was not considering yet another German *Sonderweg*. Brandt's defence minister Helmut Schmidt – although not involved in *Ostpolitik* himself – was charged with reassuring Western governments by enabling the Brandt administration to announce annually an impressive increase in the West German defence budget, thus displaying Bonn's attachment to the Western Alliance.[139] Moreover, the Chancellor himself was the living symbol of German resistance to communism and loyalty to the West. Brandt, after all, was not only a socialist who had been pursued by Hitler; he had also been prominent during the Berlin blockade when he occupied a leading political position in the city. Moreover, he had been mayor of Berlin when President Kennedy announced his support for the isolated Western enclave by declaring that he was 'ein Berliner'.[140]

In a speech in honour of former Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, Brandt, however, highlighted the positive 'inner' aspects of the Rapallo treaty signed by Rathenau in 1922. According to the Chancellor the treaty had led to the re-establishment of a normal friendly relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union. Brandt professed to have little time for the totally unrealistic 'recurrent nightmare of Western statesmen'

137. Quote from Stent, *Embargo*, p. 155; Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 734. See also Wjatscheslaw Keworkow, *Der geheime Kanal: Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik* (Berlin, 1995).

138. See Peter Koch, *Willy Brandt: Eine politische Biographie* 2nd edn (Bergisch-Gladbach, 1992), p. 412; see also Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 188; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 422.

139. See Koch, *Brandt*, p. 411; Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, p. 160; also Ehmke, *Mittendrin*, pp. 128–9.

140. Ibid. For Kissinger's portrait of Brandt's anti-communism and German nationalism see *Years of Upheaval* (London, 1982), pp. 143–5.

of yet another alleged secret Russo-German deal. Such a policy, he declared, would run counter to the national interest of the Federal Republic. The fundamental interest of any West German government lay in cooperating closely with both West and East while recognizing that the 'partnership' with the West was of an entirely different quality to the 'friendship' with the USSR. While in the 1920s a united Germany had had the option to embark upon a 'Rapallo policy', the western half of a divided nation neither could afford nor had the intention to embark on such a strategy.[141]

Brandt was, of course, quite right. Neither Adenauer before him nor he himself intended (or was in a position) to trade a more normal relationship with the East for the Federal Republic's integration in the West. But if *détente* was to be given a chance it was essential to come to a new understanding with both the Soviet Union and the GDR. This involved the complex issue of German unification and recognition of both the East German government and the post-war European borders. In his inaugural speech in the *Bundestag* following his election as Chancellor, Brandt declared: 'An international recognition of the GDR by the Federal government is out of the question. Although there are two states in existence in Germany, they do not represent foreign territory for each other; their relationship can only be of a special kind.'[142]

With these words, a West German head of government had officially acknowledged the existence of the GDR as an independent state for the first time while not explicitly stating the need for unification. Only when he mentioned the right to self-determination of all the Germans did Brandt hint at this goal indirectly. This, of course, represented a gesture towards Moscow indicating that Bonn was serious about accepting and formalizing the post-war *status quo*.[143] After all, all parties had to be willing to work for a new rapprochement. It was clear that the East would only be prepared to embark on closer relations with the West if it no longer felt threatened politically or militarily, and if its territorial borders were respected. Brandt believed that in the last resort, East–West *détente* would not make any real progress unless Bonn was prepared to come to terms with the division of Germany and the loss of the country's former eastern territories. The *status quo* had to be accepted in order to free *détente* from the German question as much as possible.

The underlying rationale of Brandt's policy was summarized by the Chancellor when he said: 'My government accepts the results of his-

141. Müller, 'Rapallo–Karriere eines Reizwortes', p. 60 (quote from ibid., my translation); Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 187; Koch, *Brandt*, pp. 410–11.

142. Quoted in Koch, *Brandt*, pp. 400–1 (my translation).

143. Ibid., p. 401.

tory.'[144] He acknowledged that the Germans only had themselves to blame for the division of Germany and the loss of the eastern territories. Persuading the West German people to accept this responsibility enabled him to embark upon a realistic political course. Moreover, Brandt hoped that his new policy would also prepare the preconditions for internal changes in the Eastern Bloc. Until then, the threat of the 'German danger' had consolidated Moscow's grip over its satellite states and inhibited any political progress. It was hoped that once this fear had disappeared, the Eastern European states would begin to develop in a much less restricted way. The catchword was '*Wandel durch Annäherung*' (change through rapprochement).[145]

Therefore, Brandt did not hesitate to say that unification had become 'very improbable' – something his predecessors had never dared to say, though even Adenauer had been convinced of this fact. Instead of talking about unification, Brandt emphasized the unity of the nation – the cultural, social, economic and political nationhood as well as the nation based on the common feeling of belonging together. To him 'there could be no return to a nation-state on the 19th century pattern'.[146] Thus Brandt spoke of 'two states but one nation' – a situation which he thought would continue for an indefinite period of time, though he did not want to exclude the possibility of German unity. Brandt used the device of 'treaties of peaceful reconciliation' for the realization of his *Ostpolitik*. However, he emphasized that these treaties were not peace treaties. After all, hardly anybody desired the conclusion of a proper peace treaty. This would almost inevitably have included the withdrawal of all Western and Eastern forces from German territory. Germany – as one or two states – would have been left to its own devices and neither the Western Allied powers nor the Soviet Union wished for this. The governments in both Bonn and East Berlin were not too keen on the idea either.[147]

On 18 November 1969, almost immediately after taking over political responsibility, the Brandt government became a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. West Germany thereby renounced all intention of ever owning nuclear weapons – an issue which had been hotly

144. He said this in the course of signing the Warsaw treaty on 7 December 1970. Quoted in Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, p. 165 (my translation); see also Koch, *Brandt*, p. 402.

145. See William E. Griffith, 'The American View', in Moreton, ed., *Germany between East and West*, pp. 53–4.

146. Anthony Glees, 'The British and the Germans: From Enemies to Partners', in Verheyen and Soe, eds, *The Germans*, p. 48.

147. Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, pp. 163–6.

debated for the last ten years.[148] The official abandonment of the 'Hallstein Doctrine' was another signal to the Soviet Union that the new government was serious about *détente* and its new *Ostpolitik*. All German embassies were told to ask the governments in their respective countries to postpone the recognition of the GDR for a little while. It was explained that Bonn was seeking to conclude a treaty with East Berlin and intended to get both governments accepted as full members of the UN.[149]

For the Brandt government it was sensible to embark upon negotiations with the Soviet Union first before dealing with the other Eastern European states. Instead of attempting to play off the USSR and its satellites, including the GDR, against each other as, until then, had been the case, Bonn intended to come to an arrangement, to the benefit of both East and West, for managing *détente*. Brandt regarded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union as the basis for a comprehensive policy of *détente* in Europe. He hoped that once the bilateral treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin and Prague had been concluded, a multilateral phase could begin. This would include agreements about the mutual reduction of troops and a conference about security and cooperation in Europe. Eventually, he intended to arrive at a point which might lead to German unification, the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the general respect of self-determination and basic human rights.[150]

Egon Bahr, Brandt's trusted adviser in the chancellery, was made responsible for the initial negotiations with Moscow.[151] Foreign Minister Scheel would only become actively involved in the final stages of the talks. It was hoped that the negotiations could be concluded as early as the summer of 1970. Late in 1969 Bonn's ambassador in Moscow, Helmut Allardt, was instructed to hold preliminary talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. On 30 January 1970 Bahr himself flew to Moscow and began negotiating in earnest.[152]

Soon, on 26 March 1970, and simultaneously with the bilateral Soviet–West German discussions, negotiations began between the three Western ambassadors accredited to the West German government in Bonn and the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin. These centred on an

148. See, for example, Johannes Steinhoff and Rainer Pommerin, eds, *Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepublik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ära Adenauer–Kennedy* (Baden-Baden, 1992). See also Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government, 1964–70: A Personal Record* (London, 1971), p. 612.

149. See, for example, Koch, *Brandt*, p. 402.

150. See ibid., p. 410; also Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 145.

151. For a critical description of Bahr see Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 146–8; idem, *White House Years*, pp. 410–11; see also Dieter S. Lutz, ed., *Das Undenkbare denken. Festschrift für Egon Bahr zum 70. Geburtstag* (Baden-Baden, 1992).

152. See Andrei Gromyko, *Memories* (London, 1989), pp. 197–201.

agreement to alleviate the political complications concerning West Berlin. At issue were, in particular, the unimpeded access to Berlin via the transit ways from the Federal Republic and the legal, political and diplomatic recognition of the city's close ties with West Germany. This was despite the fact that West Berlin was not legally a constituent part of the Federal Republic. After GDR leader Ulbricht's fall from power in May 1971 the quadripartite negotiations progressed well and were initialled in September.[153] Brandt had attempted to avoid any linkage between the Berlin agreement and the Moscow treaty. However, domestic politics and strong American pressure would not allow this. Accordingly, the West German cabinet decided that the Moscow treaty would only be presented to the *Bundestag* for ratification after an agreement over Berlin had been reached. After some hesitation this was accepted by Gromyko but Moscow now insisted on another linkage: the condition that the Berlin agreement could only come into force after the ratification of the West German–Soviet treaty.[154]

Eventually, on 12 August 1970 – almost 31 years after the Stalin–Hitler pact – the non-aggression treaty between Moscow and Bonn was signed in the Soviet capital. It acknowledged the geopolitical realities. From Moscow, Brandt was able to tell the German public: 'With this treaty nothing has been given away which had not already been lost.'[155] Henry Kissinger commented: 'The Federal Republic had crossed its Rubicon: It had accepted the division of Germany; it had sealed the *status quo* in Central Europe.'[156] The treaty with the Soviet Union meant that the West German government officially accepted the consequences of the war. By means of this agreement West Germany hoped to overcome the confrontation of the Cold War and to replace the *status quo* gradually with a policy of *détente* and peaceful co-existence. The treaty included elements which normally would have been part of an all-German peace treaty. Above all, the Soviet–West German agreement referred to the acceptance of the post-war frontiers in Europe including the border between East and West Germany. Recognition of these

153. See Stent, *Embargo*, pp. 181–2; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 421–2. See also the literature in note 154 and David M. Keithly, *Breakthrough in the Ostpolitik: The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement* (Boulder, Colo., 1986); Andreas Wilkens, *Der unstete Nachbar: Frankreich, die deutsche Ostpolitik und die Berliner Vier-Mächte-Verhandlungen 1969–1974* (Munich, 1990).

154. See, for example, Borowsky, *Deutschland*, pp. 26–34; Koch, *Brandt*, p. 417; White, *Britain*, pp. 121–2, Garthoff, *Détente*, pp. 135–9; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon, Vol. 2: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–72* (New York, 1989), pp. 464–5; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 530–4, 799ff., 824ff., 966.

155. Quoted in Koch, *Brandt*, p. 423 (my translation).

156. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 533.

borders was regarded as the precondition for the continued improvement of Soviet–West German relations. In the near future, it was planned to concentrate on intensifying economic cooperation and cultural links between the two countries. Furthermore, Bahr and Gromyko had worked out a strategy for the forthcoming negotiations with Warsaw, Prague and East Berlin. Both the Soviet Union and the Brandt government regarded *Ostpolitik*'s series of treaties as closely interlinked.[157]

In December 1970 the Brandt government signed the treaty with the Polish government in Warsaw. Among other things, the agreement recognized Poland's post-war borders. Bonn accepted the Oder–Neisse line as Germany's eastern border, thus *de facto* (though not *de jure*) giving up any claim to the territory lost to Poland and the Soviet Union as a result of the Second World War. However, the normalization of the Polish–West German relationship, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, was only to be considered after the ratification of the treaty by the West German *Bundestag*.[158] The *Bundestag* ratified the Moscow and Warsaw treaties on 17 May 1972. They came into force on 3 June 1972 – on the same day the Berlin agreement, initialled in September 1971, was formally signed by the four Allied powers.[159]

From the beginning it had been obvious that the normalization of relations with the GDR would be the most difficult part of *Ostpolitik*. Initially this consisted of two unsuccessful summit meetings between Brandt and East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph in Erfurt and Kassel in March and May 1970.[160] The second, much more successful, part of the inter-German negotiations began in January 1972 when Bahr and East German State Secretary Michael Kohl commenced talks on a traffic agreement between the two countries. The treaty was signed on 26 May. West Germans were now allowed to travel to the GDR several times a year for personal or business reasons. East German citizens could also apply to travel to the West on 'urgent family matters', though whether they would receive permission to visit the FRG was still uncertain. The Federal Republic thus accepted the GDR as a political equal. Bonn, however, had not yet recognized the sovereignty of the East German state with all the consequences regarding the issues of its borders, citizenship, reunification and membership in international organizations. Bonn particularly wished to preserve the notion of a 'special

157. On the Moscow treaty see, for example, Borowsky, *Deutschland*, pp. 19–22.

158. See ibid., pp. 22–4; Koch, *Brandt*, pp. 428–9.

159. Koch, *Brandt*, p. 458. For the texts of the treaties see Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, pp. 233ff.

160. See Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 225–9. Brandt's visit to Erfurt was, however, a huge personal success for him as thousands of GDR citizens welcomed him enthusiastically.

relationship' between Bonn and East Berlin and the concept of 'one German nation'. After all, the responsibility of the four Allied powers for the safety of Berlin rested on the latter. Between June and November 1972 these difficult negotiations took place; the so-called Basic Treaty was signed on 21 December 1972.[161]

This treaty institutionalized the *status quo* of a divided Germany. West Germany now accepted that the GDR was a sovereign and independent country within the German nation; it was acknowledged that the 'zonal frontier' constituted in fact the territorial border of the East German state.[162] This did not mean that the FRG recognized the government in East Berlin as a legitimate administration, though Brandt came close. Bonn tried to keep alive the notion that the GDR did not represent foreign territory and that the German nation, as a whole, continued to exist, for example by insisting on the exchange of permanent representatives and not ambassadors. The chancellery in Bonn and not the foreign ministry was responsible for the new West German permanent representation in East Berlin. Moreover, in the preamble to the Basic Treaty it was explicitly pointed out that both states had 'different views . . . regarding basic questions including the national question'.[163] It was therefore only consistent that the 'letter on German unity' which had been given to the Soviet Union when the Moscow treaty was signed in 1970 was also presented to the GDR. It stated that the Federal Republic had the 'political objective to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation could recover its unity in free self-determination'.[164] The Basic Treaty, however, did not deal with the question of citizenship; for Bonn a separate GDR citizenship did not exist. Still, the Brandt government agreed to give up West Germany's claim to be the sole representative of the German people.

From now on the Bonn government would cooperate increasingly with East Berlin in the economic sphere and it also included the GDR in the further unfolding of the international process of *détente*. The new relationship between Bonn and East Berlin was symbolized by the admission of both German states to the United Nations in September 1973. Much to the satisfaction of East German leader Erich Honecker, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* certainly led to a higher international profile and a considerably wider international recognition of the GDR as an

161. See, for example, Borowsky, *Deutschland*, pp. 25–6, 35–44. The text is published in Bender, *Neue Ostpolitik*, pp. 247–9.

162. Many academics at the time began to regard West Germany almost as a nation-state in its own right. See, for example, Gerhard Schweigler, *West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting* (New York, 1984).

163. Quoted in Borowsky, *Deutschland*, p. 40 (my translation).

164. Quoted in Glees, 'The British and the Germans', p. 48.

independent state.[165] Whether *Ostpolitik* actually prolonged the division of Germany or whether Brandt's strategy helped to overcome it by undermining the political, economic and cultural isolation of the Eastern Bloc was a matter of much contemporary debate. On 27 April 1972 it even led to an attempt by the Conservative opposition in the *Bundestag* to vote Brandt out of office with the help of a 'constructive vote of non-confidence'. Brandt narrowly survived the vote.[166] Ever since – and particularly after the breaching of the Wall in November 1989 and German unification in October 1990 – the controversy surrounding *Ostpolitik* has remained a hotly debated issue between neo-nationalist conservatives (the so-called generation of 1989) and the largely left-wing supporters of *Ostpolitik*.[167]

Ostpolitik's series of bilateral treaties was concluded when Bonn signed a treaty of reconciliation with the Czechoslovak government on 11 December 1973. After that, *Ostpolitik* became fully integrated into the general process of *détente* and East–West disarmament negotiations which had slowly begun in the course of 1970. Its first climax was the signing of the SALT I treaty on 26 May 1972.[168] In November 1972 discussions about a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began in earnest; they would lead to the important Helsinki conference which lasted from 1973 to 1975.[169]

Despite some 'Rapallo' fears, the British and, though somewhat less enthusiastically, the French governments, as well as almost all other NATO member states,[170] were convinced that Brandt's attempts to accept the *status quo* and make progress in the direction of a policy of *détente*

165. This development climaxed more than a decade later when Chancellor Kohl received Honecker in the course of the latter's first and only official state visit to Bonn in 1987. See, for example, Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *Germany from Partition to Reunification* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), pp. 214–17. See also Franz-Josef Strauss, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1989), pp. 497–508 (paperback edition).

166. On the CDU's attitude towards *Ostpolitik* see Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik* (Durham, NC, 1989).

167. See Klaus Larres, 'A Widow's Revenge: Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, Neo-Conservatism and the German General Election of 1994', *German Politics* 4.1 (1995), 42–63; Gordon A. Craig, 'Did Ostpolitik Work? The Path to German Reunification (review essay)', *Foreign Affairs* 73.1 (1994), pp. 162–7.

168. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 534ff.; see also, for example, John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (Washington, 1989).

169. See on the CSCE and the Helsinki conference Alexis Heraclides, *Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992* (London, 1993).

170. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 411. The Netherlands particularly supported *Ostpolitik*. See the report by Manfred Berg about the conference 'National Interest and European Order: Germany's Role in Europe since the Interwar Period', University of Mannheim, 22–5 March 1995, in *Bulletin: German Historical Institute Washington, D.C.*, No. 16 (Spring 1995), p. 13.

with the East had been more than overdue. While London viewed Brandt's activities between 1969 and 1973 largely with approval, Paris, however, fluctuated considerably 'between friendly understanding and wild speculation'.[171] Although President Pompidou 'had no personal liking for Brandt', on the whole 'he welcomed and supported . . . Ostpolitik because it meant the recognition of realities in Europe'. Nevertheless, Pompidou would always remain slightly 'distrustful toward ulterior motives both in Moscow and in Bonn that might eventually lead to the "Finlandization" of Germany and the expansion of Soviet power in Europe'.[172] Both France and Britain wished to maintain the *status quo*; they had no interest in the unification of the nation and the possibility of 'new German hegemony'.[173] Therefore Britain 'warmly encouraged' the Brandt government's *Ostpolitik*. The attempts to enter into agreements with Moscow and Warsaw were seen by Prime Minister Harold Wilson as 'highly positive and innovative'.[174] Early in 1970 during a visit to Washington Wilson had even 'urged on Nixon the benefits of Brandt's policy as if no other approach were conceivable'.[175] Although the subsequent Conservative government of Edward Heath had a somewhat cooler attitude to *Ostpolitik* than Wilson, it also supported Brandt's initiatives.[176] 'Without doubt . . . [the British] believed that *détente* lessened the risk of war in Europe and in the world. It seems likely, too,

171. Brandt, *My Life in Politics*, p. 175 (*Erinnerungen*, p. 189).

172. Contribution by George Soutou, 'President Pompidou and the Ostpolitik', as summarized in a report by Manfred Berg on the conference 'National Interest and European Order: Germany's Role in Europe since the Interwar Period', p. 12 (see note 170). See also Thierno Dialli, *La Politique étrangère de Georges Pompidou* (Paris, 1992), pp. 56–67; Herbert Tint, *French Foreign Policy since the Second World War* (London, 1972), pp. 101–5; Dirk Buda, *Ostpolitik à la Française: Frankreichs Verhältnis zur UdSSR von de Gaulle zu Mitterrand* (Marburg, 1990).

173. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 409. In *Years of Upheaval*, p. 146, Kissinger explains: 'It was a staple of the conversations of Pompidou, Heath, and Nixon that Brandt's Eastern policy would, however unintentionally, sooner or later unleash a latent German nationalism. A free-wheeling, powerful Germany trying to maneuver between East and West, whatever its ideology, posed the classic challenge to the equilibrium for Europe, for whatever side Germany favored would emerge as predominant. To forestall this, or perhaps outflank it, each of Brandt's colleagues – including Nixon – sought to preempt Germany by conducting an active détente policy of its own. In this sense Ostpolitik had effects far beyond those intended. It contributed to a race to Moscow and over time heightened mutual suspicions among the allies.' See also *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 731–2.

174. Quotes from Wilson, *The Labour Government*, p. 765; Glees, 'The British and the Germans', p. 48.

175. Quote from Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 416.

176. See John Campbell, *Edward Heath: A Biography* (London, 1993), p. 346; Alec Douglas-Home (Lord Home of the Hirsel), *The Way the Wind Blows: Memoirs* (London, 1976), pp. 250–1; also Roger Morgan, 'The British View', in Moreton, ed., *Germany between East and West*, p. 90.

that they believed that, in practical terms, the German Question had been solved.'[177]

After all, West Germany had given up any attempts to revise the results of the Second World War. Instead it had built a bridge to Eastern Europe. Britain realized that it would soon be possible to recognize the GDR diplomatically. In general, the East German economy was much overrated by British politicians. They believed 'that the GDR occupied an important position within the Soviet system and hoped that diplomatic recognition would produce a considerable increase in British exports to the GDR'.[178] In 1981 the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, summarized the British view of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in a speech in Stuttgart:

> Your reconciliation with your Eastern neighbours gave great satisfaction to your fellow Europeans. It gave us all a greater sense of security too. The resulting increases in your contacts with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union enriched the lives of millions and did much to erode the mistrust which divides this continent of Europe.[179]

However, it has also rightly been said that *détente* forced Britain to abdicate its solitary Cold War role as a semi-independent intermediary between the US and the USSR and become a team player within the Western European concert of nations; this soon included membership of the European Community.[180] Moreover, 'a successful Ostpolitik threatened significantly to reduce British influence in Moscow. A normalization of FRG–Soviet relations inevitably reduced Soviet fears of a revanchist Germany. To the extent that Moscow had hitherto looked to the British and the French to restrain the Germans, their value was consequently reduced.' This was one of the reasons why both London and Paris involved themselves closely in the quadripartite Berlin negotiations in 1971. Despite increased competition from Bonn, both countries would insist on their traditional role as global players.[181]

Throughout the negotiations with the Soviet Union, the GDR and other Eastern European nations, there existed what Brandt called in his memoirs a 'carefully hidden mistrust' about what the West Germans were up to and what the consequences would be for the international *status quo*. When the Chancellor, on the invitation of Leonid Brezhnev, travelled to the Crimea in September 1971 'for an unprecedented private

177. Glees, 'The British and the Germans', p. 48.

178. Ibid., p. 49; see also Morgan, 'The British View', pp. 91–2.

179. Quoted in Morgan, 'The British View', p. 92.

180. On Britain's entry into the EC see Campbell, *Heath*, pp. 353ff.; also Uwe Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market* (London, 1973).

181. See White, *Britain*, pp. 130–3 (quote: p. 131); Morgan, 'The British View', p. 91.

meeting' without first having consulted his Western allies, he realized that he had to be 'quick to point out that this meeting did not signify another Rapallo. . . . Brandt always had to find a delicate balance between his independent Ostpolitik and the need to reassure the United States of the FRG's reliability.'[182]

While mistrust did exist in London and Paris, it was most prevalent in Washington. Initially, those Americans who paid attention to the development of *détente* in Europe – mostly old Cold Warriors like Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Lucius Clay, but also Thomas Dewey, George Ball, Kenneth Rush, the American ambassador to Bonn, and of course Henry Kissinger – were 'deeply disturbed' and viewed the developments 'with great alarm'.[183] Perhaps the strongest opponent of *Ostpolitik* was former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In August 1970 he wrote to a friend: 'My real worries centre about Willy Brandt's foolish flirtations with the Russians. . . .' Acheson believed that *Ostpolitik* represented nothing more than traditional German nationalism: 'Fear I am not sufficiently au courant to see anything new in Ostpolitik or Brandt's Rapallo policy.' He particularly resented the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw as dangerous precedents for a general acceptance of the *status quo*. He advised publicly that 'Brandt should be cooled off' and the 'mad race to Moscow' ought to be slowed down. Many observers suspected that the White House had encouraged Acheson to make these remarks. Only when Acheson became increasingly outspoken and even declared that *Ostpolitik* was merely a domestic political ploy by Brandt to save his coalition from falling apart did Washington rebuke the former Secretary.[184]

At first, Nixon himself disliked Brandt's initiatives.[185] Moreover, Nixon and also most of Brandt's other opponents in Washington, above all Kissinger, strongly distrusted the Chancellor personally.[186] However, in his memoirs Henry Kissinger writes about Brandt: 'I personally liked him – Nixon less so – but his policy worried us both.'[187] He continues by claiming that Brandt was the European statesman whose policy made Nixon 'most uneasy and whose personality was perhaps most

182. Stent, *Embargo*, p. 184.

183. Quotes from Ambrose, *Nixon*, Vol. 2, p. 386; Brinkley, *Acheson*, p. 295.

184. See Brinkley, *Acheson*, pp. 287, 291–6; also Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 191–2.

185. See Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 189–93; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 405ff.; Ehmke, *Mittendrin*, pp. 140–2.

186. For example, when Brandt in the course of a meeting with Nixon in December 1971 expressed his gratitude for NATO's support of *Ostpolitik*, according to Kissinger's account, 'Nixon frostily corrected him, saying that the alliance did not object to the policy'. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 966.

187. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 143; see also Brinkley, *Acheson*, pp. 293–5.

incompatible with his own'.[188] This clearly contradicts the impressions of other observers. David Binder, a journalist and author of a Brandt biography, quotes one of Kissinger's former advisers. According to this source, Kissinger and his aides Alexander Haig and Helmut Sonnenfeldt (like Kissinger an *émigré* from Nazi Germany) 'intensely disliked Brandt and his chief aide, Egon Bahr'. Roger Morris, a member of Kissinger's staff in the White House until his resignation in autumn 1970, supports this view. He believes that Kissinger 'hated Ostpolitik and Willy Brandt from the beginning', while Nixon 'liked Brandt better than most European politicians'. This led Kissinger to play '[a] charade in which his real feelings and irrational attitude toward Brandt were never transferred upstairs to the Oval Office. With Nixon he couldn't insult the Germans.' Furthermore, Morris is convinced that 'Henry thought the Germans were flirting with historical tragedy; that Ostpolitik would be a prelude to internal fascism, a turn to the right, and the emergence of another Weimar Republic'.[189]

The Nixon administration was certainly worried that *Ostpolitik* would 'finally come together on some nationalist, neutralist program, as Adenauer and de Gaulle had feared'.[190] Moreover, after the French exit from NATO's integrated military command in 1966, de Gaulle's all too obvious rapprochement with the Soviet Union and his talk about the East–West conflict as a predominantly European concern,[191] Washington feared similar developments in Bonn. The Federal Republic might also be tempted to break the 'West's united front toward Moscow' and endanger the Western alliance. Washington had realized that 'there were only three powers capable of disrupting the postwar *status quo* in Europe – the two superpowers and Germany'. The American government believed that, unlike Adenauer, Brandt 'never had an emotional attachment to the Atlantic Alliance' and that Egon Bahr, his closest adviser and, according to Kissinger, 'an old-fashioned German nationalist',[192] 'was also free of any sentimental attachment to the United States'.[193] Brandt's policies were therefore regarded as potentially dangerous.

188. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 155. According to Kissinger, Nixon's 'suspicion of Brandt' never 'abated'. See *White House Years*, p. 416. Brandt seems to have had similar reservations about Nixon. For the Nixon–Brandt relationship see also Richard Barnet, *The Alliance* (New York, 1983), pp. 283–321.

189. Quotes from Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 416.

190. Quote from Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 735; see also idem, *White House Years*, pp. 408, 410; idem, *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 144–6.

191. See Garthoff, *Détente*, pp. 124–5; Dialli, *La politique étrangère*, pp. 80ff.; Tint, *French Foreign Policy*, pp. 148ff.

192. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 147.

193. Idem, *White House Years*, p. 411.

It was, however, gradually recognized that *Ostpolitik*'s time had come and that it could not be stopped. Thus, Nixon and Kissinger felt that attempting to obstruct this policy would be equally dangerous. It seemed to be necessary to accept *Ostpolitik* in order to avoid 'the risk of cutting the Federal Republic loose from the bonds of NATO and the restraints of the European Community'.[194] Moreover, Kissinger soon sought to capitalize on the developments. *Ostpolitik* gave the USA the opportunity of ending the permanent crisis over Berlin. He was convinced that it was only his insistence on a linkage between *Ostpolitik* and free access to Berlin that had led to the success of the negotiations and the Berlin Agreement of 1971/72. He wrote proudly: 'Berlin disappeared from the list of international crisis spots.'[195] According to the White House, it was its Eastern policy which prevented the nationalistic elements in Brandt's *Ostpolitik* from coming to the surface: 'Our role was decisive for the ultimate success of Ostpolitik and the Berlin negotiations.'[196] Although this claim is doubtful, it is true to say that the signing of the Berlin Agreement did much to lessen the Nixon administration's antagonism towards *Ostpolitik*.[197]

While many American foreign policy experts were sceptical towards Brandt's *Ostpolitik* on principle, the US administration was not fundamentally opposed to the general direction of Willy Brandt's policy.[198] After all, global *détente* was more or less the one foreign policy area in which glory was heaped on the American government. It is obvious that Nixon and Kissinger disliked the independence and confidence with which the West Germans pursued their new foreign policy. Washington was of the opinion that if anyone was to initiate a serious East–West *détente* it should be the USA. This factor contributed considerably to the suspicion with which Brandt's policy was regarded by the Nixon administration.[199] It is therefore not surprising that in his memoirs Kissinger does not forget to emphasize that despite all obstacles he managed to uphold the process of 'close consultation' with Bonn and was able to influence the Brandt government's policy. He does, however, admit that 'the new German government informed rather than

194. Quotes from Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp. 735–6. See also Ambrose, *Nixon*, Vol. 2, pp. 386–7; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 410–11; idem, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 146.

195. Quote from Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 736. See also Ambrose, *Nixon*, Vol. 2, pp. 464–5; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 415–22.

196. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 381.

197. See Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, p. 187.

198. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 190; Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, p. 187.

199. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 189, 192; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, p. 416; Ehmke, *Mittendrin*, p. 128.

consulted. They reported progress; they did not solicit advice.'[200]

The Rapallo factor was occasionally mentioned when suspicion about the 'nationalistic undercurrents' in Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was voiced in the United States and elsewhere, particularly in 1970.[201] While neither London nor Paris seriously believed that West Germany was about to break away from the Western camp, Washington at times expressed strong reservations. The view that West Germany was developing a new *Schaukelpolitik* between East and West was not always dismissed. While in 1955 the British and the French had been most mistrustful of the West German government's intentions, in 1970 it was the US administration which was very sceptical. However, once the United States had itself become actively involved in *Ostpolitik* by partaking in the Berlin Agreement and negotiating the SALT I Treaty, 'Rapallo' ceased to be an issue. The situation in 1955, when Adenauer established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, was similar to the era of *Ostpolitik* insofar that, after an initial period of heightened mistrust, the 'Rapallo factor' played only a minor role in Germany's relations with the West.

The Western powers, particularly London and Paris, had realized with relief that Brandt's policy, like Adenauer's strategy in the 1950s, would not lead to unification in the short run. Only in the USA did politicians find it difficult to understand that the Brandt government was not seeking a quick route to unification any more. The general Cold War view was still widely shared that it would be an 'illusion of peace' if there was a 'settlement based on the *status quo*'.[202] However, Kissinger and others later realized that 'insisting on German reunification against the wishes of the German government' made little sense; 'we could not be more German than the Germans'.[203] Eventually even Henry Kissinger admitted that 'it was to Brandt's historic credit that he assumed for Germany the burdens and the anguish imposed by necessity'.[204] However, in principle – and in stark contrast to London and Paris – Washington never wavered in its support for the desire of many Germans to

200. Quotes from Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 411, 530. In his memoirs Kissinger expresses great pride in his skill at bypassing the State Department and developing a backchannel with Bahr and Soviet ambassador Dobrynin 'by which we [the White House] could stay in touch outside the formal procedures'. See ibid., pp. 411–12 (quote: p. 411); also Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 417ff.; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (London, 1992), pp. 322–7.

201. Quote from Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 799.

202. John Foster Dulles said this during a speech to the Amerian Society of Newspaper Editors on 18 April 1953. Quoted in Larres, *Politik der Illusionen*, p. 124.

203. Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 530.

204. Ibid., p. 410; see also idem, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 145.

unify their nation. This explains to some extent the different reactions in the Western capitals to the events of 1989/90.

CONCLUSION: UNIFICATION AND AFTER

It is well known that, following the breaching of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, only the United States expressed full, though qualified, support for German unification.[205] British Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Mitterrand and also President Gorbachev in Moscow were much less enthusiastic about having to deal with a united Germany of 80 million people.[206]

In late 1989, when events were assuming an altogether unexpected pace, it was Margaret Thatcher, above all, who wished to prevent or at least 'slow down' unification. She believed that a 'truly democratic East Germany would soon emerge and that the question of reunification was a separate one, on which the wishes and interests of Germany's neighbours and other powers must be fully taken into account'.[207] She reprimanded her Trade and Industry Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, when, during an interview in July 1990, he declared that Germany was about 'to take over the whole of Europe' – albeit reluctantly. Ridley thought that relinquishing part of British sovereignty to the EC was tantamount to handing it to Adolf Hitler. He implied that Hitler was preferable to Kohl: 'I am not sure I wouldn't rather have the shelters [of World War II] and the chance to fight back.'[208] Similarly, the comments by Lord Rees-Mogg, who expected a 'German Age' but hopefully without swastikas and concentration camps, and by Conor Cruise O'Brien, predicting a rehabilitation of racial theories and a rise of respect for Hitler, seemed to reflect the thinking of much of the Anglo-Saxon

205. See Peter H. Merkl, *German Unification in the European Context* (University Park, Penn., 1993), pp. 5–6, 315–18; Gregory F. Treverton, *America, Germany and the Future of Europe* (Princeton, NJ, 1992), pp. 180–3; Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany United and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft*, Cambridge, Mass, 1995.

206. On the British and French attitude see Merkl, *German Unification*, pp. 318–25.

207. Quotes from Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London, 1993) (paperback edition), pp. 797–8, 792; see also pp. 813–15.

208. Quoted in Merkl, *German Unification*, p. 4; see also Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, 'German Unification: Views from Germany's Neighbours', in Wolfgang Heisenberg, ed., *German Unification in European Perspective* (London, 1991), pp. 75–6; Thomas O. Hueglin, 'Gross-Deutschland in Europe', in William D. Graf, ed., *The Internationalization of the German Political Economy: Evolution of a Hegemonic Project* (Basingstoke, 1992), pp. 285ff.

political elite.[209] Moreover, it soon became known that in March 1990, Thatcher herself had convened an academic seminar in Chequers to be briefed 'on the many undesirable attributes of the "German character" '.[210] In late 1990, after 40 years during which the West had never stopped criticizing the Soviet Union for preventing the democratic unification of Germany, the British Prime Minister was convinced that unification had arrived 'prematurely'.[211]

In 1990 it was generally feared that unification would produce an economic superpower which might well either turn its back on both European integration and the Western security system or assume the domination of western Europe and antagonize the United States.[212] Neither Thatcher nor anybody else foresaw the enormous economic and social difficulties inherent in unification. These problems would ensure that in the immediate post-Cold War years Germany would be entirely occupied with its domestic problems to the exclusion of all else.[213] Moreover, the Gulf War of 1991 and the UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1990s showed that, in purely power-political terms, united Germany was similar to West Germany. There was no will to dominate its European partners. Instead, 'a desire for national continuity rather than the dominance of others' could be observed. The hasty German recognition of Croatia in 1992 seems to have been a sad exception to this general tendency.[214]

Initially, there was also some fear 'that Germany – first under the spell of Mr Gorbachev and later with the lure of reunification – might . . . [move] away from the Western alliance towards neutralism'.[215] But once Gorbachev had, in February 1990, in exchange for the promise of a considerable amount of financial aid to the Soviet Union, declared that German unity should be decided by the Germans themselves and had

209. See Merk, *German Unification*, p. 323.

210. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

211. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 814.

212. Ibid., pp. 813–15.

213. Regarding Germany's economic problems see, for example, Gerlinde Sinn and Hans-Werner Sinn, *Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 19ff.

214. See *Financial Times*, 24/9/1994 (article by David Marsh); see also David Marsh, *Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity* (London, 1994). On the recognition of Croatia see Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (Boulder, Colo., 1995), pp. 53–66; and on the country's new international role in general see Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification* (London, 1994), pp. 94ff. For authors who call for a more prominent German role in world politics, see, for instance, Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* (Berlin, 1994).

215. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 783.

also given his public consent to a united Germany being a member of NATO, this fear was not significant any more. The 'Rapallo factor' did not detrimentally influence the process of German unification in 1990 to any considerable extent.[216] With American and Soviet agreement to changing the *status quo* of the Cold War, it had become clear to the dissenting junior partners in London and Paris 'that there was nothing we could do to halt German reunification'.[217]

While even Thatcher came to believe that talk about 'Germany loosening its attachment to the West was greatly exaggerated',[218] there was a widespread belief in 1990 that the Germans would soon dominate eastern Europe economically if not territorially. Mitterrand and Thatcher were genuinely worried about 'the Germans' so-called "mission" in central Europe'. The united German nation, they believed, would be able to use its economic power to have an almost exclusive influence over countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Thatcher came to the conclusion: 'we must not just accept that the Germans had a particular hold over these countries, but rather do everything possible to expand our own links there'.[219] Thus by the time of German unification the Rapallo factor had undergone a considerable transformation. A German *Schaukelpolitik* between East and West or a German–Soviet rapprochement and a simultaneous weakening of Germany's ties with the West were no longer feared. Rather, the fear of German economic hegemony (followed by political dominance) in both the new capitalist states in the east and the European Union in the west has become the dominant issue.

There can indeed be no doubt that since the 1970s and 1980s the Federal Republic has been the prime beneficiary of the EC system. Its penetration of EC export markets enabled it to obtain by far the largest market share. It outsold its major European rivals both globally and regionally. The Federal Republic was therefore the only EC country able to accumulate persistently huge trade surpluses. Thus by 1989, West German economic influence in the EC was clearly dominant.[220] During the same decades West Germany had also obtained considerable eco-

216. For a good overview see Stephen F. Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York, 1992). For Kohl's and Gorbachev's 'deal' see the memoirs of a former West German government minister: Hans Klein, *Es begann im Kaukasus. Der entscheidende Schritt in die Einheit Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1991).

217. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p. 798.

218. Ibid., p. 784.

219. Ibid., p. 798.

220. See Andrei S. Markovitz and Simon Reich, 'Should Europe Fear the Germans?', in Michael G. Huelshoff *et al.*, eds, *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland: German Politics after Unification* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1993), pp. 277–8.

nomic influence in Eastern Europe. This applied at the micro as well as the macro level. Particularly since the early 1970s the FRG has become Eastern Europe's most important Western trading partner: 'one would find it extremely difficult to find any category of commerce and trade in which the Federal Republic has not consistently been the most important Western presence in Eastern Europe'.[221] *Osthandel*, the economic and commercial side of *Ostpolitik*'s strategy of *détente*, 'most certainly gave the Germans a running start in Eastern Europe for the post-cold war era'.[222]

Since 1989/90 Germany's influence in eastern Europe has grown even more. Almost all of the new eastern European capitalist states view Germany's historic *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) and the country's successful transition to liberal democracy and prosperous capitalism in the post-war years as a role model.[223] They consequently believe that advice and investment ought to come from there. In stark contrast to Margaret Thatcher's and Milton Friedman's uninhibited free market philosophy, the Federal Republic's much more restricted and controlled (and more successful) so-called 'social market economy' appeals to most of the former socialist states. Moreover, the traditionally strong German cultural and linguistic influence in eastern Europe has re-emerged and has contributed to the huge German economic penetration of these countries.[224]

While there is, of course, resentment and some fear of united Germany's potentially powerful economic position in both western and eastern Europe, any expectations regarding German military domination and future territorial conquest are unjustified. The Kohl government in Bonn is certainly not interested in the military domination of any other nation; the Federal Republic is probably not even intent on achieving economic hegemony. However, as countries to the west and particularly to the east 'are busily immersing themselves in a web of relations' with the Federal Republic, this may well be the outcome.[225] Geir Lundestad's expression 'empire by invitation', which referred to the American role

221. Ibid., p. 283. In 1989 West German trade to all Eastern European countries except the USSR was almost four times greater than Italy's and still larger than those of Italy, the US and France combined. Regarding the USSR, West Germany's sales exceeded those of the US, the runner-up, by almost 50 per cent (see ibid.).

222. Quote from ibid., p. 283.

223. On the development and characteristics of the social market economy see Anthony J. Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963* (Oxford, 1994).

224. See Markovitz and Reich, 'Should Europe Fear the Germans?', pp. 284–7; also the various articles in Heinz D. Kurz, ed., *United Germany and the New Europe* (Aldershot, 1993), pp. 89ff.

225. Markovitz and Reich, 'Should Europe Fear the Germans?', p. 286.

in Western Europe during the Cold War, may soon describe the Federal Republic's position in eastern Europe, at least in the economic and financial field.[226]

Still, unlike the United States during the Cold War, Germany both before and after unification has not been actively looking for a political (and certainly not military) leadership role. Such a tendency may, however, emerge in the future. During the five years since unification, the government in Bonn, however, has been very hesitant to contradict France's traditional though somewhat illusionary conviction that Paris is the natural leader in the EU. Germany is very reluctant about assuming a greater leadership role.[227] This, however, may gradually be changing; economic ascendancy almost inevitably leads to at least some degree of political dominance. Germany's insistence on a seat in the UN Security Council and the decision by the German supreme court that participation in international UN peacekeeping missions and NATO activities out of area do not contradict the Basic Law show this. It is true that the domestic debate in the Federal Republic about 'Germany's national identity, its national interests, and its proper international role, is still unresolved' – but the Germans will soon find it impossible to avoid these issues any longer.[228] At the moment the united nation is still following a policy well summarized by Renate Schmidt, a Social Democratic member of parliament: 'We want to harness ourselves in Europe. We don't want to dominate. . . . We don't want to be a great nation. We want our economic power to be controlled within Europe.'[229] Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt thinks that this is not necessarily a purely altruistic strategy but also serves 'to prevent coalitions against Germany from ever happening again'. Germany clearly wants to maintain a balance of power in Europe by binding itself into a greater entity.[230]

This, of course, corresponds to the wishes of both France and Britain.

226. See Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945–49* (New York, 1980), chapter 6.

227. See *Financial Times*, 27/1/1995 (Michael Stürmer), p. 16; ibid., 18/1/1995 (Ian Davidson), p. 20; *Washington Post*, 22/6/1995 (Rick Atkinson), p. A24. See also Gordon, *France, Germany*, pp. 83ff.

228. Quote from the *Financial Times*, 21/11/1994 (Quentin Peel), p. xvi. On 4/6/1994 Peel wrote in the same paper (p. xv): 'Germany's reemergence as the dominant economic power in Europe has been accompanied by a great inner search for a new national identity and pride, a debate about the dangers of nationalism and a huge effort to find its proper equilibrium in the centre of Europe.' See also Lothar Gutjahr, 'Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests', *Review of International Studies* 21.3 (1995), 301–17.

229. *Financial Times*, 4/6/1994 (Peel), p. i; also 21/11/1994 (Peel), p. xvi.

230. Ibid., 4/6/1994, p. i. See also Helmut Schmidt, *Handeln für Deutschland: Wege aus der Krise* (Berlin, 1993), pp. 198ff.

After all, the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 had the hidden agenda of binding Germany, more populous and, as was suspected, economically stronger than ever, into an even more closely integrated Europe. The western European nations had no alternative but to agree to German unification in 1990, but decided to anchor the Germans firmly into the EU while at the same time 'domesticating' the Deutschmark and breaking 'Germany's de facto dominance of European monetary affairs by emasculating and (later) scrapping the D-Mark'.[231] Bonn had agreed to this in return for unification. But it also pressed for the development of a closer political European union.[232] The German government hoped that this would create a new equilibrium in Europe in general, and also balance the Franco-German partnership much better.[233] 'Ever closer integration into the European Union . . . was seen as the other side of the coin of German unification, the essential reassurance for the rest of Europe that a unified Germany would be no threat.'[234]

Since then, Germany has not only remained an advocate of deepening the EU. It has also come out strongly in favour of widening the EU by offering full membership not only to Austria and the Scandinavian countries, but also to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, and possibly even the Baltic states and Slovenia.[235] Many observers are convinced that eastern enlargement (like the entry of Austria, Sweden and Finland in January 1995) would only strengthen Germany's economic position in the EU further. However, others like Britain plainly believe that such a course would dilute the EU's supranationalism and should therefore be welcomed. London is in favour of merely concentrating on eastern enlargement and against proceeding with the deepening of the EU. The French would be happy to make progress with the deepening of the Union while ignoring the pressure of admission from the eastern European states. In contrast, Germany is the only member of the EU which is 'equally committed to widening and deepening simultaneously'. General disagreement exists about the actual pace of reforming the EU.[236] The German view was well summarized in a policy paper entitled 'Reflections on European Policy' which was drawn up by the CDU group in the *Bundestag* in November 1994:

231. *Financial Times*, 13/3/1995 (Marsh), p. 10.
232. Ibid., 23/1/1995 (Lionel Barber), p. 16.
233. Ibid., 27/1/1995 (Stürmer), p. 16.
234. Ibid., 21/12/1994 (Peel), p. xvi.
235. Ibid., 12/12/1994 (Barber), p. 2.
236. Ibid., 21/11/1995 (Peel), p. xvi; ibid., 16/12/1994 (leading article), p. 19. If there was a decision to welcome eastern enlargement, Paris would almost certainly insist on balancing any such policy by a Mediterranean strategy.

> The only solution which will prevent a return to the unstable pre-war system, with Germany once again caught between East and West, is to integrate Germany's central and eastern European neighbours into the (West) European post-war system, and to establish a wide-ranging partnership between this system and Russia. . . . Germany has a fundamental interest both in widening the EU to the East, and in strengthening it through deepening. Indeed, deepening is a precondition for widening. Without such further internal strengthening, the Union would be unable to meet the enormous challenge of eastward expansion. It might fall apart, and once again become no more than a loose grouping of States unable to guarantee stability.[237]

Political and economic stability, not hegemony and dominance, is what united Germany is most interested in. It therefore hopes that the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference in Turin will mean another 'big step towards European integration' – this time, though, to appease the British, in a somewhat more pragmatic way.[238] While in the post-Cold War world the 'Rapallo factor' so far has not seriously affected Germany's relations with the West, the country will still not be able to ignore its traditional role on the European continent. Germany can escape neither its history nor its geography:

> Germany will be the swing power in Europe, involved in an eternal balancing act between east and west, seeking to reconcile and integrate. It will do so with one hand still tied behind its back. For it will still be loath to lead, and merely seek to react to the initiatives of others.[239]

One can be more optimistic, however. After all, multinational corporations are paying less and less attention to national boundaries. Ever-increasing globalization may well mean that it will soon be impossible 'to talk of countries running dominant economic policies'. Moreover, when the eastern enlargement of the EU is eventually realized, the original rationale for monetary union may well become obsolete and the old concept of differentiating between eastern and western Europe may lose all relevance. Soon, it may not even be feasible to embark on a 'Rapallo policy' any more:

> There is no longer a need . . . to 'bind' Germany to western Europe to stop it turning eastwards. The idea of Europe being divided into east and west

237. Ibid., 21/11/1994 (Peel), p. xvi.
238. Ibid.
239. Ibid.; see also Fritsch-Bournazel, 'German Unification', pp. 73–4.

is outdated. Poland and the Czech Republic will soon become normal countries.[240]

If this was to come true, the Rapallo factor in Germany's relations with the West would have been laid to rest for good. Throughout the Cold War and in the post-1990 world – despite occasional ill-founded fears and suspicions – 'Rapallo' and its associations with an aggressive, expansionist Germany, cooperating closely with Russia and not being averse to plotting against the West, never played a genuinely influential role in Germany's relations with the Western world. 'Rapallo' nevertheless serves as a useful reminder that united Germany ought not to aspire to become too powerful. It would do no harm to observe, at least to some degree, a healthy balance of power within an enlarged European Union. It is true, in the current transitionary phase of world politics, that Germany has developed more of a 'special relationship' with both Russia and the other eastern European nations than anyone else in the West. But any government in Bonn or Berlin would do well to remember that ultimately the roots of post-Cold War Germany's stability, security and prosperity lie in its close cooperation with the USA, Britain and France. As the United States may well be on the way towards relative 'splendid isolation', in European affairs a *ménage à trois* of Germany, France and Britain in the economic, political and security field would best ensure that renewed suspicion about German intentions is avoided.[241]

In this respect, post-1989/90 Europe is not that different from the Europe of the Cold War: the hegemony or dominance of any one European country is not required; desirable are cooperation and integration. A policy is called for which is firmly rooted in the former Western Europe but is open-minded and equally cooperative regarding the countries of what used to be referred to as Eastern Europe. United Germany's foreign policy ought not to be characterized by impulsive swings. Rather, in order to incorporate the new and complex post-Cold War developments without destabilizing the European continent, continuity and reliability must be the order of the day. If this is realized, then the lessons of 'Rapallo' and the widespread suspicions connected with this word in the post-1945 world will have been learned.

240. *Financial Times*, 24/9/1994 (Marsh), p. i. See also Hélène Seppain, 'European Integration, German Unification and the Economics of Ostpolitik', in Kurz, ed., *United Germany*, pp. 73–86.

241. For Anglo–German–French cooperation in the security field see above all Gordon, *France, Germany*, pp. 31ff.; *Financial Times*, 27/1/1995 (Stürmer), p. 16; ibid., 18/1/1995 (Davidson), p. 20; ibid., 20/1/1995 (Dominique Mosi), p. 14.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SINCE 1949

Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification

Edited by Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi

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